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Abstract
This Article looks in detail at whether the Special Court is, at present, succeeding or failing,
drawing lessons along the way both for the system of international criminal justice generally, and
more specifically for U.N. enforcement of the law of war. In Section II, this Article suggests a
method for measuring success and failure in an international criminal tribunal. It suggests that
there are a number of identifiable performance standards which should guide our assessment, each
linked to a stakeholder group: the international community, the affected population, and the defendants. In Sections III-V, this Article assesses the Special Court’s early performance from the
perspective of each of these stakeholder groups, against these performance standards. In Section
VI, it assesses the implications of these trends, suggests ways that negative consequences might be
avoided or at least minimized, and points to longer-term implications, particularly for the U.N. involvement in the enforcement of the law of war. This Article concludes that a hybrid tribunal, like
the Special Court, engages with a range of dynamics affecting the humanitarian community and
complex peace operations that the ad hoc tribunals have avoided, but which produce unexpected
effects in the context of criminal justice. Those dynamics are not presently taken into account
either in the design and resourcing of the Special Court, or in stakeholders’ expectations of what
it can achieve. Careful consideration of these challenges is required lest “hybrid” tribunals upend
the maxim “no peace without justice,” preventing peace by pursuing justice.

THE FRAYING SHOESTRING: RETHINKING
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INTRODUCTION
The young system of international criminal justice has
reached a turning point. After a full decade of experimentation
with ad hoc tribunals, national-international hybrids, universal jurisdiction, and permanent international criminal courts, practitioners and commentators are in a mood of reflection.1 Practitioners tend to assess the last decade positively, recognizing the
limitations of U.N. experiments in enforcing the laws of war
through penal sanctions, while drawing lessons they claim will
improve enforcement in the future.2 In contrast, observers external to the field - including, crucially, the diplomats and government officials who hold the purse-strings - are often less
positive.' The incredible costs and operational challenges of the
ad hoc tribunals have tried the patience of many States, particularly those in the North.4 Where "never again" was once the
* Graduate Scholar, Institute for International Law and Justice ("IILJ"), New York
University; Intern, Defence Office, Special Court for Sierra Leone June-August 2004.
This Paper was made possible by the support of a Human Rights Fellowship from the
NYU Center for Human Rights and GlobalJustice ("CHRGJ"). I thank the following for
invaluable commentary on earlier drafts: Allison Cooper, Justice Richard Goldstone,
John Wesley Hall, Wayne Jordash, Phoebe Knowles, Simone Monasebian, Kaoru
Okuizumi, Caitlin Reiger, Rupert Skilbeck, James G. Stewart, Giorgia Tortora, Quincy
Whitaker, and Marieke Wierda. The views in this Article, like the errors, are mine
alone.
1. SeeJonathan I. Charney, The Impact of the InternationalLegal System on the Growth of
International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 697-98 (1999).
2. For examples of these assessments, see Symposium, The ICTY 10 Years On: The
View from the Inside, 2(2) J. INT'L CRIM.JUsT. 353, 353-597 (2004); see also Ralph Zacklin,
The Failings of Ad Hoc InternationalTribunals, 2(2) J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 541 (2004).
3. See Zacklin, supra note 2, passim.
4. The Rule of Law and TransitionalJusticein Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report
of the Secretary-Ceneral U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 5052d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(2004), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html [hereinafter Rule of
Law]. The Rule of Law summarizes these costs:
The two ad hoc tribunals have grown into large institutions, with more than
2,000 posts between them and a combined annual budget exceeding a quarter
of a billion dollars - equivalent to more than 15 per cent of the Organization's total regular budget. Although trying complex legal cases of this nature
would be expensive for any legal system and the tribunals' impact and performance cannot be measured in financial numbers alone, the stark differen-
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catch-cry of anti-impunity activists, now it has become the underthe-breath muttering of Permanent Representatives on their way
to approving another tribunal budget at U.N. Headquarters in
New York. The ad hoc tribunals have been told to cut costs,
streamline case management and devise "completion strategies"
a very different kind of "rush to judgment."5 When it receives
new requests for assistance to fight impunity, the international
community turns increasingly to hybrid models - like the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Special Court") - as a low-cost,
quick turn-around alternative.6 This is what one commentator
has described as "shoestring" justice.7
Because the various U.N. experiments in enforcing the laws
of war have all involved the United Nations in direct management of prosecutions of international crimes, these experiments
tial between cost and number of cases processed does raise important questions.
Id. 42.
5. See Theodor Meron, ProceduralEvolution in the ICTY, 2(2)J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 520
(2004); see also Stdphane Bourgon, ProceduralProblems HinderingExpeditious and FairJustice, 2(2)J. INT'L CRIM.JUST. 526 (2004); Mirko Klarin, The Tribunal'sFour Battles, 2(2)J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 546 (2004).
6. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone wrote to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan on June 12, 2000, requesting that the United Nations establish a court
to try those who had committed atrocities in the ten-year civil war. On August 14, 2000,
the Security Council, in Resolution 1315 (2000), requested Annan to negotiate to establish such a court. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1315 (2000). An Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone ("Special Court") was signed in Freetown on
January 16, 2002. See, e.g., Press Release, Government of Sierra Leone and United Nations Sign Agreement Establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), at
http://www.specialcourt.org/documents/PlanningMission/PressReleases/ 16JAN02.
html. The Special Court exists outside both the Sierra Leonean judicial structure, and
the existing ad hoc tribunals' structure, but is guided in different ways by legal norms
drawn from both jurisdictions. It is staffed by both national and international staff. See
Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess., 915th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000) [hereinafter Secretaiy-General's Report]; see also S.C. Res. 1315, supra; INTERNATIONAL CRSIS GROUP, THE SPECIAL
COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: PROMISES AND PITFALLS OF A "NEW MODEL" 3, 4, 10 (2003)
(stating that "[c]oncerns to avoid appearing to be another overly large, cumbersome
and virtually open-ended tribunal largely determined how the Special Court was set
up") [hereinafter PROMISES AND PITFALLS]; Douglas Farah, Sierra Leone Court May Offer
Model for War Crimes Cases: Hybrid Tribunal, with Limited Lifespan, Focuses on Higher-Ups,
WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2003, at A21; Eric Pape, A New Breed of Tribunal, NEWSWEEK INT'L,
Mar. 10, 2003; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BRINGING JUSTICE: THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 16 (8(A)) (2004) [hereinafter BRINGING JUSTICE].
7. See Avril McDonald, Sierra Leone's Shoestring Special Court, 84 INT'L REv. OF THE
RED CROSS 121 (2002).
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are sometimes described as one unified enterprise. The reality is
very different: the different institutions are the results of very
different political compromises, and have been given very different mandates. Perhaps most significantly, some of these experiments involve prosecutions in theaters far removed from the theater of military operations which form the subject of the judicial
inquiry, whether that removal is a result of distance (as in the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY') 8 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR") 9 ), or time (as in the new Extraordinary Chambers in
Cambodia, established by agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom of Cambodia to try crimes under the
Khmer Rouge between 1975 and 1979).'o Others, such as the
Special Court and the prosecutions in Kosovo and East Timor,
occur in the same social and legal space as the alleged military
crimes in question, soon after their alleged commission." These
"in-theater" experiments consequently engage with a range of
political, social, economic and security dynamics which pose particular challenges to our traditional notions of law enforcement
and criminal justice, and especially to the United Nations' involvement in them.
It is striking that it is those very tribunals that have been
established to operate "in theater," confronting these additional
challenges, that have been characterized as "shoestring" justice."

Those institutions

-

like the Special Court -

are in

many ways being asked to do more than their ad hoc cousins, but
with fewer resources. Even more striking is that this should be
8. See Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess. Annex, 3217th mtg., art. 20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993), as amended by S.C. Res. 1166, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1166
(1998), S.C. Res. 1329, U.N. SCOR, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1329 (2000), S.C. Res.
1411, U.N. SCOR, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1411 (2002), S.C. Res. 1431, U.N. SCOR,
Annex II, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (2002), S.C. Res. 1481, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1481 (2003) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], available at http://www.un.org/icty/
legaldoc/index.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
9. See Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., art. 19, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), as amended by S.C.
Res. 1431, U.N. SCOR, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1431 (2002) and S.C. Res. 1512,
U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1512 (2003) [hereinafter ICTR Statute], available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
10. See Cambodian Genocide Program, art. 4, RS/RKM/0801/12, available at http://
www.yale.edu/cgp/KR.trans.06.09.2001html (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
11. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 6.
12. See McDonald, supra note 7, at 138-42.
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done through a "hybrid" model. The aim is to marry the best of
two worlds - the expertise of the international community with
the legitimacy of local actors; but the risk is to intermix the worst
of both - the externality of international actors with the weakness of local institutions which produced the violence in question.1 3 The danger that such institutions, if not properly designed or resourced, will produce resentment rather than reconciliation cannot be entirely discounted. And if the United
Nations is implicated in such a failure, the flow-on effects for a
broader peace operation in the country in question may be significant. Allowing these U.N. "hybrid" tribunals to fail risks turning the two U.N. goals in these enterprises - peace and justice from complementary to competing objectives.
At this moment of reflection for the field of international
criminal justice, this piece aims to consider some of the challenges for hybrid tribunals - and the U.N. involvement with
them - that have, to date, been little scrutinized. The issue is
considered through a discussion of the first couple of years of
work of the Special Court. That institution stands in a critical
position in the development of U.N. involvement in the enforcement of the law of war. Political support and financial resolve
for prosecutions on the scale of the ad hoc tribunals is dwindling.14 The International Criminal Court ("ICC") faces sustained opposition from the United States, and perhaps also
other great powers such as China.15 The East Timor and Kosovo
experiments have largely passed, meeting with mixed reviews. 16
The willingness of States to finance the Extraordinary Chambers
in Cambodia - or even to try violations of international humanitarian law committed in Liberia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, and Darfur - will turn significantly on their perceptions7
of the success or failure of the "hybrid" model in Sierra Leone.'
13. See id. at 126.
14. See Zacklin, supra note 2, at 545.
15. See Pape, supra note 6.
16. See F.M. Lorenz, The Rule of Law in Kosovo: Problems and Prospects, 11 CRIM. L. F.
127 (2000).
17. For discussions of the various hybrid institutions, see Suzannah Linton, Cambodia, East Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in InternationalJustice, 12 CluM. L. F. 185
(2001); see also Lorenz, supra note 16; Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Building a New Judicaryfor
East Timor: Challenges of a Fledgling Nation, 11 CRAM. L. F. 259 (2000); INTERNATIONAL
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CRYING WITHOUT TEARS: IN PURSUIT OFJUSTICE AND
RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE (2003), available at http://www.ic .org/downloads/
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In the pages which follow, I look in detail at whether the
Special Court is, at present, succeeding or failing, drawing lessons along the way both for the system of international criminal
justice generally, and more specifically for U.N. enforcement of
the law of war. In Section II, I suggest a method for measuring
success and failure in an international criminal tribunal. I suggest that there are a number of identifiable performance standards which should guide our assessment, each linked to a stakeholder group: the international community, the affected population, and the defendants. In Sections III-V, I assess the Special
Court's early performance from the perspective of each of these
stakeholder groups, against these performance standards. In
Section VI, I assess the implications of these trends, suggest ways
that negative consequences might be avoided or at least minimized, and point to longer-term implications, particularly for
the U.N. involvement in the enforcement of the law of war. I
conclude that a hybrid tribunal, like the Special Court, engages
with a range of dynamics affecting the humanitarian community
and complex peace operations that the ad hoc tribunals have
avoided, but which produce unexpected effects in the context of
criminal justice. Those dynamics are not presently taken into
account either in the design and resourcing of the Special
Court, or in stakeholders' expectations of what it can achieve.
Careful consideration of these challenges is required lest "hybrid" tribunals upend the maxim "no peace without justice,"
preventing peace by pursuing justice.
I. MEASURING SUCCESS AND FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
How can, and should, we measure success and failure in international criminal tribunals? A comprehensive answer to this
question would require much deeper and more extensive reflection than I can offer in these pages, but in order to assess the
current direction of the Special Court and the system of international criminal justice, we need to establish some yardsticks, however rudimentary. My aim here is not to provide a comprehenCrying._WithoutTearsdesigned.pdf

[hereinafter

CRYING WITHOUT TEARS]; INTERNA-

TIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, INTENDED TO FAIL: THE TRIALS BEFORE THE

AD Hoc HUMAN RIGHTS COURT IN JAKARTA (2003),

available at http://www.ictj.org/
downloads/IntendedtoFail-designed.pdf;
Suzanne Katzenstein, Hybrid Tribunals:
Searchingfor Justice in East Timor, 16 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 245 (2003).
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sive framework for such assessments, but simply a rudimentary
model; it might well be criticized and contested elsewhere.
Broadly stated, international criminal tribunals have three
groups of stakeholders, each with distinct interests: the international community; the population affected by the alleged crimes;
and the defendants themselves. For each stakeholder group, we
can identify certain minimum performance standards from the
legal and political discourse surrounding a particular tribunal.
These will usually include some benchmarks relatively precisely
defined in legal rights, such as fair and expeditious trial and due
process.1 8 In addition, they will include less precisely defined
standards such as financial propriety and cooperative behavior
with other members of the international community.19 Some
standards will not apply to all tribunals, but only to the specific
tribunal in question - for example the expectation that the
Special Court's work might be completed within three years.2"
We might also consider that the interests of different stakeholder groups should be prioritized in some manner: for example, that due process is a sine qua non of good practice for international criminal tribunals. Making that assessment is beyond
the scope of this Article. My aim here is simply to come up with
rudimentary measures of success and failure that will allow us
better to understand whether the Special Court is meeting the
high expectations placed on it, and where it is finding unexpected challenges. My approach in this is simply summarized in
Table 1 (below). I identify three stakeholder groups, to which
the Special Court for Sierra Leone owes distinct governance responsibilities.2 1 Its success or failure in discharging those responsibilities can be measured by reference to performance standards arrived at as a matter of legal or political consensus, re18. See Press Release, Council Agrees on Creation of War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. SC/6910 (2000) (stating that the "international community will
exert every effort to bring those responsible to justice in accordance with international
standards of justice, fairness and due process of law").
19. See, e.g., Global Policy Forum, The International Community's Resolve to End
Impunity Must Be Strengthened, Apr. 24, 2001, available at http://www.globalpolicy.
org/security/issues/ sierra/ court/ 2001/0424ai.htm.
20. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., App. II, art. 2, § 4,
U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002) [hereinafter Special Court Agreement].
21. See Secretary General's Report, supra note 6.
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flected in the legal texts which provide the legal foundations of
the Special Court and its practice.
In Sections III-V, I use these performance standards to assess signs of success and failure emerging from the early performance of the Special Court.
TABLE 1:

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR THE SPECIAL COURT
FOR SIERRA LEONE

Stakeholder
groups

Governance
responsibility

Performance standard

Performance standard
reflected in...

International
community

Expeditious trial

Completion of trial
(and if possible
appeal) processes
within 3 years

Political consensus
reflected in Letter
Dated 12 July 2001
from the SecretaryGeneral Addressed to
the President of the
22
Security Council.

Financial propriety

Financial management
in accordance with
international standards

Agreement Between the
United Nations and the
Government of Sierra
Leone on the
Establishment of a Special
Court for Sierra Leone
("Special Court
Agreement"), arts. 5-6
Financial Regulations
and Rules of the
Special Court for
Sierra 2Leone;
2003
4
Audit.

Good management
practices

Satisfaction of
Management
Committee; meeting
international best
practice, including on
judicial propriety

Special Court Agreement,
art. 625 ; Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra
Leone ("Special Court
Statute"), arts. 13, 25.26

22. Letter Dated 12 July 2001 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2001/693 (2001) [hereinafter SecretaryGeneral's Letter].
23. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 5-6.
24. Shauket A. Fakie, Summary Report of the Auditor (Mar. 26, 2004) (submitted
to the Management Committee for the Special Court), available at http://www.sc-sl.
org/documents.html.
25. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.
26. See Statute of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., App. II,
Attachment, arts. 13, 25, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002) [hereinafter Special Court
Statute].
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Affected
population

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
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International comity

Cooperation with
States, good faith use
of privileges and
immunities

Special Court Agreement,
arts. 12-17.27

Investigation and
prosecution of those
bearing the greatest
responsibility

Good faith
investigations and
prosecutions to
international standards

Special Court Statute,
art. 1, § 1.28

Security and
reconciliation

Improved security
situation and
improvement in the
prospects of peace;
expedition of national
and regional
reconciliation

U.N. S.C. Resolution
1315 ("S.C. Res.
1315"), pmbl., 11 6,
11.29

Generation of an
accurate and impartial
historical record

Credible and accurate
record provided by
trial proceedings

S.C. 3Res.
1315, pmbl.,
0
4.

Respect for victims'
rights

Protection of victims'
security to a level
provided by other
international criminal
courts, including
through a Victims and
Witnesses Unit; access
to compensation

Special Court Statute,
art. 16, § 4 & art. 17,
§ 231; Special Court
Agreement, art. 16.32

Legacy creation

Strengthening the
judicial system;
developing respect for
the rule of law

S.C. Res. 1315, pmbl.
1033; Report of the
Secretary-General on
the Establishment of a
Special Court for
Sierra Leone
("Secretary-General's
7.34
Report"),

Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, arts. 12-17.
Special Court Statute, supra note 26, art. 1, § 1.
S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6, pmbl., 1 6, 11.
id. 4.
Special Court Statute, supra note 26, art. 16, § 4 & art. 17, § 2.
Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, art. 16.
id. 10.
Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6,
7.

624

FORDHAM1NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

Defendants

[Vol. 28:616

Satisfaction of pre-trial,
mid-trial and postconviction detention
standards

Compliance with
internationally
recognized detention
standards

Special Court Statute,
art. 223; Rules
Governing the
Detention of Persons
Awaiting Trial or
Appeal before the
Special Court for
Sierra Leone or
Otherwise Detained on
the Authority of the
Special Court for
Sierra Leone ("Rules
36
of Detention").

Fair and expeditious
trial

Internationally agreed
due process rights

Special Court Statute,
art. 1737; Rules of
Procedure and Evidence,
R. 33-4638; S.C. Res.
9
5.3
1315, pmbl.

II.THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITYS PERSPECTIVE
A. Expeditious Trial
The Special Court was designed as a bold experiment with a
new, hybrid form of international criminal justice, seeking to
combine existing local enforcement capacity and international
expertise. As the foundational documents of the Special Court
make clear, it was hoped that this new model, by capitalizing on
the capacities of the domestic judicial system, would offer improvements over the ad hoc criminal tribunals in a number of
areas, most obviously the speed and cost of trial.
Measured on the performance standard of speed, the Special Court has to date done well, by most accounts. The formal
agreement establishing the Court came only in mid-January
35. See Special Court Statute, supra note 26, art. 22.
36. Rules Governing the Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or Appeal before the
Special Court for Sierra Leone or Otherwise Detained on the Authority of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court of Sierra Leone, Mar. 7, 2003 (amended May 4,
[hereinafter Rules of
2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/documents.html
Detention]. These rules are substantially based on the Standard Minimum Rules for the
Treatment of Prisoners,adopted by the U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, 1955, endorsed by the U.N. Economic and Social Council,
Resolution 663 C (XXIV),July 31, 1957. See E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048 (1957).
37. See Special Court Statute, supra note 26, art. 17.
38. See SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. PROC. & EVI. R.33-46, available at http://
www.sc-sl.org/scsl-procedure.html.
5.
39. See S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6, pmbl.,
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2002. By the end of August 2004, a remarkable number of complex administrative and litigation processes had been completed
or were well under way: the investigation of crimes to international standards; the location and arrest of suspects; the establishment of adequate detention facilities; the construction of a
court-house and compound after an international design competition; the acquisition of 1.6 megawatts of electrical power for
the Court; the establishment of a medical clinic; installation of
microwave communications links; establishment of security capacities and protocols; creation of a website; a large and diverse
outreach program; the employment and training of hundreds of
local and international staff in jobs ranging from translation to
transport; the disposal of more than 150 pre-trial motions; and
the commencement of two joint trials. These are all significant
achievements of which the Special Court should be proud.4"
Nevertheless, danger signs have emerged since the commencement of trials in June 2004.
The early pace of trials was remarkably slow.4 1 Early pretrial assessments suggested that the Court might meet its target
of completing its work by the end of December 2005.42 Unfortunately, the first few months of both the Civil Defense Force
("CDF") and Revolutionary United Front ("RUF") trials were relatively slow, both in terms of the number of witnesses called and
the proportion of the indictments covered. Both trials were disrupted somewhat by defendants changing counsel or refusing to
attend trial.4 ' The pace of trial was not assisted by a noticeable
willingness on the part of the Bench to adjourn proceedings,
40. See First Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone:
For the Period 2 December 2002 - 1 December 2003, Special Court of Sierra Leone,
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/specialcourtannualreport2002-2003.pdf (last.visited
Feb. 2, 2005) [hereinafter First Annual Report]. The First Annual Report provided by
the Special Court contains a much more comprehensive account of the Court's developments. Id. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 4.
41. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 13-16, App. (analyzing the timeliness of
rulings on motions).
42. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 1.
43. See Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman for Self Representation Under Article 17(4) (d) of the Statute of the Special Court, Prosecutor v. Norman,
Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-125, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Trial Chamber 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF-decisions.html [hereinafter Self-Representation Decision]; Gbao - Decision on Application to Withdraw Counsel, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case
No. SCSL-04-15-T, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber 2004, availableat http://
www.sc-sl.org/gbao.html; Prosecutor v. Sesay, Ruling on the Issue of the Refusal of the
Third Accused, Augustine Gbao, to Attend Hearing of the Special Court for Sierra Le-
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and a limited hearing schedule, including lunch-breaks of up to
three hours in the first months of the trials." A revised schedule
since early September 2004 appears to have accelerated hearings
a little, and the completion of an on-site canteen is also expected
to reduce luncheon adjournment times. However, even if the
current pace is significantly accelerated, projections allowing for
the Court's monthly alteration of CDF/RUF trials and for scheduled court recesses4 5 indicate that it will take until at least December 2005 just to hear the Prosecution case in each trial, with
more than 150 prosecution witnesses in each trial. That is not
accounting for the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
("AFRC") trial, to be heard by a trial chamber which was established only in early 2005.46
It would be easy to dismiss the slow pace of proceedings as
"teething problems," if proceedings were open-ended. But the
life of the Court is not indefinite: it has assured political support, as reflected in the attitude of the Management Committee,4 7 only until December 2005.48 Its life beyond that point reone on 7 July 2004 and Succeeding Days, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T-194, Special Ct. for
Sierra Leone, Trial Chamber 2004, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/gbao.html.
44. Cf BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 17 (criticizing the court for inefficient
courtroom management).
45. The Court has scheduled recesses each August and December. See BRINGING
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 17; see alsoJudicial Calendar for Trial Chambers No. 1, Special
Court for Sierra Leone, at www.sc-sl.org/calendar.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
46. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 8, 12-13; see also Press Release, Special
Court for Sierra Leone, Judges of Second Trial Chamber Sworn In (Jan. 17, 2005),
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-011705.pdf [hereinafter Second
Trial Chamber].
47. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 20.
Article 7 ("Management Committee") of the Special Court Agreement states:
It is the understanding of the Parties that interested States may wish to establish a management committee to assist the Special Court in obtaining adequate funding, provide advice on matters of Court administration and be available as appropriate to consult on other nonjudicial matters. The management
committee will include representatives of interested States that contribute voluntarily to the Special Court, as well as representatives of the Government of
Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General.
Id.
In practice, the Management Committee consists of major donor and activist countries:
Canada (formerly Chair), Lesotho, Netherlands, Nigeria, the United Kingdom (new
Chair), and the United States, as well as the Sierra Leone government and the Secretary-General represented by the Office of Legal Affairs. See Letter to the President of the
Security Council (Dec. 22, 2000), U.N. Doc. S/2000/1234; Letter Dated 6 March 2002 from
the Secretary-Generaladdressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess.,
at 9, 43, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002). Its role has additionally encompassed: identify-

2005]

THE FRAYING SHOESTRING

mained under negotiation at the time of writing.4 9 There is no
time for "teething problems." The commencement of the AFRC
trial is also likely to slow matters down: although a second Trial
Chamber has been appointed to hear this case, 5" it was unclear
whether there would be additional budgetary support for provision of additional legal officers in the Chambers5" - meaning
the already-thinly stretched Chambers support staff could be
forced to cover three trials.
Two steps can be taken to remedy this problem. First, the
parties themselves must do what they can to expedite proceedings without harming due process rights. They have begun to do
so, e.g., by working to agree on matters which could be judicially
noticed.5 2 Further steps could be taken. For example, the Prosecution currently plans to call over 150 witnesses in each case;
similar cases are often tried in the ad hoc tribunals with fifty witnesses.5" Second, judicial practice can improve; the control of
ing Registrar, Prosecutor and judicial candidates; securing funding; and reporting to
interested States. See id. In addition, a Group of Interested States ("GIS") was established (under Term of Reference 3(f)) which receives reports from the Management
Committee, and thereby monitors the progress of the Court and provides an advocacy
base within the U.N. system. Id. Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
the United States provided two-thirds of the Court's first-year budget. See INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE

EIGHTEEN MONTHS 10 (2004), available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/
SC SLCaseStudy.designed.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) [hereinafter FIRST EIGHTEEN
MONTHS]; see also First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 30; Decision on Preliminary
Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Judicial Independence), Prosecutor v. Norman,
Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber 2004,
available at http://www.sc-sl.org/norman.html. An application by Chief Norman for a
declaration that the Court lacked jurisdiction over the indictees or, alternatively, for a
stay pending financial guarantees on the basis that the Management Committee's financial control over the Court breached international standards ofjudicial independence,
was dismissed. See id.
48. Twenty-Second Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2004/536 (2004),
39 [hereinafter Twenty-Second Report].
49. See Fakie, supra note 24, at 29; see also Request for a Subvention to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone: Thirty-First Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary
Questions, 58th Sess., Agenda Item 121,
2, U.N. Doc. A/58/7/Add.30 (2004) [hereinafter Subvention Request].
50. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 12-13; see also Second Trial Chamber,
supra note 46.
51. See id. at 15.
52. See, e.g., Decision on Prosecution's Motion forJudicial Notice and Admission of
Evidence, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT, (Trial Chamber 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/norman.html.
53. For example, in the celebrated Aleksovski case in the ICTY, only 36 witnesses
FIRST
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the pace of trial is one of the central tasks of the Bench5 4 . The
Chambers are deliberately - and properly - insulated from external pressures such as the Management Committee. 5 Any attempt by that body to encourage a rapid acceleration in proceedings would be an improper interference with judicial independence. 5 6 The turn-around must, therefore, come from the
judges themselves. And since the Trial Chamber has given little
indication of probable acceleration of proceedings - despite
rhetorical nods to the need for expedition 57 - the onus must
fall on the President of the Court, Judge Ayoola, to encourage
his fellow judges to move the pace along.5" A drastic acceleration of trials is required, or the Court will simply run out of
money and friends.
It is also important to note one other criticism that might be
leveled at the Court in relation to expeditious trial. One of the
means by which the Court has ensured expedition of the trial
process is by severely limiting the numbers of those indicted.5 9
As we shall see below, this has drawn criticism that the Court is
failing the local population.6 ° Equally, however, this may be
seen as a failure to meet its responsibilities to the international
community: by indicting so few, the Special Court has in fact
begun to replicate the high cost/conviction ratio seen in the ad
hoc tribunals. 6 ' It may represent a lower cost option than those
were called. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case IT-95-14/1-T, [1999] Int'l Crim. Trib. For
Fmr. Yugoslavia (Trial Chamber),
11; see also infra note 263 and accompanying text.
54. See SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. PROC. & EVID. R.26 bis. Rule 26 bis

(adopted May 29, 2004) charges the Trial and Appeals Chamber with ensuring a "fair
and expeditious" trial. Id.
55. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, art. 7 (referring to the Management
Committee consulting on non-judicial matters).
56. See id.
57. See, e.g., Self-Representation Decision, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T-125, Special Ct.
for Sierra Leone, 26 (Trial Chamber 2004).
58. See SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. PROC. & EVID. The President might offer

this counsel under his power to "co-ordinate the work of the Chambers." Id. at R.19.
59. See BRINGING JUSTMCE, supra note 6, at 2.

60. See id. at 2-3.
61. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 5-6. By September 2004, the Special

Court had only indicted 13 individuals and is not expected to indict more than a few
more individuals. This makes the ratio of indictments to spending and resources very
high. The article cited suggests that the amount of resources available should allow for
the Court to expand its indictments past the few top officials to include mid-level commanders who have also committed numerous, heinous crimes. See id.
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tribunals - but it also represents a lower output option.6 2 In
other words, the "hybrid" model may offer the United Nations
and its member States a less costly model of enforcing the law of
war - but it may also be a less effective model, in the long run.
B. FinancialPropriety and Good Management Practices
Perhaps even more impressive than the fact that the Special
Court has achieved so much in such a short time, prior to the
commencement of trials, is that these achievements have not
generally come at the cost of financial propriety or good management practices. The 2003 Audit of the Court, carried out by
a national-level auditor operating according to international accounting standards,6 3 indicated that the Court's operations had
to that point been carried out in accordance with relevant international financial and management standards6 4 - no mean feat
in corruption-riddled West Africa,6 5 especially given that the
Court's finance section was "tasked with providing all the necessary functions of both a field mission" and UNHQ.6 6 Moreover,
the Special Court's human resources management is clearly
miles ahead of much U.N.-wide practice, managing to combine
national diversity with relatively fast employment times, as well as
employing both national and international staff.6 7 The Special
Court enjoys significant freedom as a result of not being gov62. See id.
63. See Fakie, supra note 24. The Report was conducted in accordance with the
common auditing standards of the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations,
the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. See id. 1. "The
Internal Audit Division of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) performed an
internal audit of the Special Court for Sierra Leone... in report AP 2003/61/1 (OBS-7)
[dated May 6, 2003]." Id.
82, 83.
64. These standards include those established by the Financial Regulations and
Rules of the Special Court, approved by the Management Committee on June 21, 2002.
These are based on relevant U.N. financial regulations from 1985 (recently updated).
See Fakie, supra note 24. The Report was conducted in accordance with the common
auditing standards of the Panel of External Auditors of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency. See id. 1; see also First
Annual Report, supra note 40, at 29.
65. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, TRANSPARENCY INT'L CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2004, available at http://www.transparency.org (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
66. First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 20.
67. But see 1(2) SPECIAL CT. WATCH 1 (Jan. 2003) (on file with the author) (criticizing the slow pace of recruitment of Sierra Leonean staff). Local staff hold 40% of
professional positions with the Court, and between 50% and 60% of all positions. See
BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 36. Cf First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 20
(listing 106 international staff members and 149 national staff members).
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erned by U.N. administrative rules. To date, the Court has not
abused that freedom, but instead has chosen to use it creatively
and successfully. 68 Most insiders attribute that success to the
leadership of the Registrar, Robin Vincent, but it is also a result
of careful pre-planning by the Management Committee, and the
benefit of lessons learned from the ad hoc tribunals.6 9
Despite this overall good track record on management issues, the Special Court cannot be given an entirely clean bill of
health on this performance standard. There are two key
problems, both of them structural.
The first problem, which infects all of the Special Court's
activities, is the financial uncertainty which flows from financing
by voluntary contributions from U.N. Member States.70 States
have proved unwilling to voluntarily contribute sufficient funds
even to meet the tight, three-year, U.S.$57 million budget originally approved for the Court by the Management Committee. 7 '
As the 2003 Audit of the Special Court bluntly stated:
The Special Court has not received sufficient contributions
and pledges to cover its future operations. This condition...
indicate [sic] the existence of a material uncertainty, which
may cast doubt about
the Special Court's ability to continue
72
as a going concern.
Consequently, "at the very moment when trials were about to
68. Unfortunately, most sources focus on criticism rather than praise.
69. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 1-2. Unlike past ad hoc tribunals, the
Special Court is located in the country where the crime was committed, which eliminates many logistical problems concerning witnesses. It also hires a significant number
of Sierra Leone nationals, thereby leaving skilled staff behind to perpetuate the justice
system. The court prosecutes both domestic as well as international crimes, whereas
other only prosecuted international crimes. See id.; see also First Annual Report, supra
note 40, at 30 (concerning the planning stages of the Management Committee).
70. See S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6,
8(c); see also Secretary-General'sReport, supra
note 6, 1 56, 68-72; Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, art. 6.
71. See Secretary-General's Letter, supra note 22. The Management Committee exercises financial control over the Court under the Financial Regulations and Rules of
the Special Court, approved on June 21, 2002, especially Art 4. See First Annual Report,
supra note 40, at 29-30 (discussing funding and the role of the Management Committee). The original proposal was for a budget of U.S.$114.6 million over three years. See
Annan Authorizes Tribunal Despite Funding Shortfall, U.N. WIRE,Jan. 4, 2002, available at
http://www.unwire.org/UNWire/20020104/22831-story.asp.
The approved budget
now stands at U.S.$75 million over three years. See FIRST EIGHTEEN MONThS, supra note
47, at 10; BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 4; see also Author's Correspondence with
Court Official (Sept. 2004) (on file with author).
72. Fakie, supra note 24, at 1.
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begin, the Court has confronted a serious financial crisis."
The
Secretary-General's request to the General Assembly for a subvention from Member States' assessed contributions was, mercifully, approved in the amount of U.S.$16.7 million, 4 tiding the
Court over until December 200471 - though voluntary contribu76
tions remained the preferred mode of finance for the Court.
Even now, though, the financial future of the Court remains uncertain. Human Rights Watch states that as of July 2004, only
U.S.$49.3 million had actually been paid,77 and indicates a
budget shortfall through 2005 of U.S.$23.3 million; 7 the Court's
First Annual Report indicates that third-year funds were used in
the second-year to shore up shortfalls.7 9 When approached on
this issue in September 2004, a Court official indicated that only
three of thirty-six States had not honored pledges, representing
only U.S.$206,000 dollars in unmet pledges; that the Court had
not called for the disbursement of the original U.S.$16.7 million
subvention; and that the U.N. General Assembly would shortly
approve additional funds through the end of December 2005.0
The radical divergence in these assessments of the Court's financial position makes the very uncertainty of that position clear:
financing depends on the Court constantly working to convince
Member States to provide more cash to stave off impending financial paralysis. It will not be surprising, therefore, if the Court
73. Rule of Law, supra note 4, 9143.
74. See Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, G.A. Res. 58/284, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., Supp.
No. 7A, 912, U.N. Doc. A/Res/58/284 (2004). This was on the understanding that any
regular budget funds appropriated for the Court would be refunded to the United
Nations at the liquidation of the Court, if sufficient voluntary contributions had been
received. See id. at 23 n.9; see also Subvention Request, supra note 49, 914; Request for a
Subvention to the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Report of the Secretary-Genera 9112, U.N.
Doc. A/58/733 (2004).
75. See Twenty-Second Report, supra note 48, 9139; see also G.A. Res. 58/284, supra
note 74, 912.
76. The Resolution requests "the Secretary-General, in concert with the Management Committee, to redouble efforts to raise voluntary contributions" and appeals "to
Member States, as a matter of urgency, to contribute voluntary funds in support of the
Court and to honour existing pledges." G.A. Res. 58/284, supra note 74, 91 3-4.
77. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 4.

78. BRINGINGJUSTICE, supra note 6, at 5. Beyond these 18 months, there are significant long-term costs which have not yet even been addressed: witness protection, detention of convicts, the retention of a residual judicial capacity to hear matters relating
to detention and, more than likely, the costs of Charles Taylor's trial. See id.
79. See First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 36.
80. See Author's Correspondence with Special Court Official (Sept. 2004) (on file
with author).
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at some point in the next year or two again faces a budget crisis,
especially if the expected termination date of December 2005
comes and goes with the trials - let alone appeals - uncompleted.
Three consequences may flow: first, as the crisis looms, international personnel will jump ship, seeking greater security
elsewhere; 81 second, if the crisis actually arrives, the day-to-day
operations of the Court might be imperiled as contractors (and
perhaps employees) stop work; third, any bail-out from the
United States - or even the Management Committee powers would risk fatally tainting the political independence of the
Court in the eyes of observers, including the Sierra Leone population.
This financial uncertainty, if it grows, may also raise issues
beyond questions of management. The Secretary-General highlighted some of these before the Special Court was established:
The risks associated with the establishment of an operation of
this kind with insufficient funds, or without long-term assurances of continuous availability of funds, are very high, in
terms of both moral responsibility and loss of credibility of
the Organization, and its exposure to legal liability. In entering into contractual commitments which the Special Court
and, vicariously, the Organization might not be able to honour, the United Nations would expose itself to unlimited
third-party liability. A special court based on voluntary contributions would be neither viable nor sustainable. 8 2
There are additional concerns. Defendants might, for example,
claim that detention by an institution with an uncertain financial
future, which may not be able to complete the trials for which it
has detained them for over two years, amounts to arbitrary detention.
The second structural issue arises from turnover at the Special Court. Financial uncertainty has recently spilled over into
uncertainty over senior management positions within the
Court.8" Perhaps most threatening was the proposed departure
81. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 7, 25 (explaining that the present practice of paying defence counsel a fixed, lump sum for all expenses incurred while representing the defendants already creates an incentive for counsel to work less, even when
more work is absolutely necessary).
82. Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6, 1 70.
83. See Funding Shortfallfor Sierra Leone War Crimes Court to Be Made up by the U.N.,
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of Robin Vincent, the highly successful and greatly respected
British Registrar.8 4 He formally resigned in the middle of 2004,
effective later that year, but many at the time read it as an attempt to leverage significant changes out of the Management
Committee (including greater financial security for the Court as
a whole).85 During a trip in September 2004 to New York to
discuss the Special Court's Completion Strategy,8 6 he withdrew
his resignation. His actual departure would have been a severe
blow to the Court. Similarly, there has been significant turnover
in the senior trial positions within the Office of the Prosecutor in
the last few months. The most senior attorneys in both the CDF
and RUF/AFRC prosecution complexes departed shortly after
the commencement of trials. These departures plainly cannot
assist the quality of prosecutions; and are also reflective of a
broader pattern of comparatively high turnover at the Special
Court.8 7 More recently, both the Prosecutor and the Principal
Defender have announced their departures.8 8
That turnover is high, however, only if we compare the Special Court to the ad hoc tribunals. Compared to long-term peacekeeping missions, this rate may not be so high. In fact, many
Special Court international staff have extended their stay well
beyond their initial contracts. The living and working conditions in Freetown, and the fact that the Special Court is not a
"family duty station," inevitably lead to higher turnover than we
find in The Hague.8 9 The increased costs which flow from it personnel costs, loss of institutional memory and others" FR. PRESSE, Aug. 6, 2004, available at 2004 WL 89182953 [hereinafter Funding
Shortfall].
84. See Special Court RegistrarAnnounces Resignation, DAILY NEWS FROM SIERRA LEONE,
Aug. 4, 2004, available at http://www.visitsierraleone.org/news/newsitem.asp?NewsID=108 (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
85. See Funding Shortfall, supra note 83.
86. See Twenty-Second Report, supra note 48, 1 40. For the introduction of the "Completion Strategy" approach in the ICTY and ICTR, see S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 48th
Sess., 4817th mtg., pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003).
87. To my knowledge this has not been documented, but it is self-evident to anyone who works with or at the Court for any significant period.
88. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court Prosecutor to
Step Down (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/prosecutor-022805.
pdf; see also Vacancy Announcement, Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 2 (Mar. 7,
2005), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Vacancies/SCSL-2005-013.pdf.
89. It would be useful, however, to compare turnover at the Special Court and
ICTR. I am indebted to Caitlin Reiger for many of these points.
90. The provision on relocation allowances has apparently recently been deleted
AGENCE
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must be factored into both stakeholders' expectations, and future institutional design. The Management Committee might
address turnover by fine-tuning compensation packages to encourage (and perhaps even reward) long-term service to the
Court, but the current nature of the lifestyle in Freetown and the
short lifespan of the Court both tend to encourage short-term
employment. 1 A heavy reliance on interns who are paid from
extra-budgetary sources, but often limited to a six-month-stay,
and who are on short-term contracts designed to keep them, and
other staff members, under conditions of financial uncertainty,
also exacerbates turnover. 2 High turnover is to be expected as
part of the hybrid tribunal package, a direct consequence of locating the tribunal "in theater." Its costs must be factored into
both the Court's budgets, and the Management Committee's expectations of what can be achieved in three years.
Overall, the Special Court has done a remarkable job in
maintaining financial propriety and in achieving good management practices. Its continued ability to do so, however, depends
on a more realistic assessment by the Management Committee
- and the U.N. community generally - of the costs of such
success. If the Special Court fails because of under-resourcing, it
will not be the Court that has failed the international community, but the international community that has failed the Court.
C. InternationalCooperation
The financial insecurity of the Special Court is symptomatic
of its broader inability, as an institution established by treaty between the United Nations and the host State, to secure cooperation from States and international organizations."3 For the ad
hoc tribunals, both financial and judicial cooperation flowed
from the Staff Rules and Regulations, reducing these costs. See Author's Correspondence with Court Official (Sept. 2004) (on file with author). However, indirect costs
from relocation remain: new staff must, for example, spend more time getting to know
the basics of life in Freetown, and new arrivals are also notoriously prone to mild sickness as their immune systems adjust to different environmental inputs. Both factors
reduce productivity. See id.
91. See Bruce M. MacKay, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone - The First Year, 35 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L 273, 276 (2003).
92. See Special Court for Sierra Leone, Internship Programme, at http://www.sc-sl.
org/internships.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
93. See Report of the Security Council Mission to West Africa, 20-29June 2004, U.N.
SCOR,
39, U.N. Doc. S/2004/525 (2004) [hereinafter West Africa Report].
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from their Chapter VII mandates.9 4 The Special Court, lacking
such a mandate, must persuade each and every State and international organization to cooperate with it on specific issues, not
merely involving funding, but also regarding issues such as identification of, and access to, evidence, witnesses and suspects.9 5
Beyond considerations of justice, the only real incentive for the
Special Court's interlocutors to cooperate with the Court is their
reputation as good international citizens. Since the informal
norm that has emerged in relation to State cooperation with the
Special Court is, however, one of non-cooperation, or at best lethargic and tardy cooperation, few reputation-related costs flow
for States that drag their feet, play deaf or simply refuse to cooperate.
The most obvious example of this problem is the Special
Court's continuing incapacity to secure custody of Charles Taylor, its most prominent indictee.9 6 The impotence of the Court
is underscored by the fact that Taylor is currently in Nigeria and Nigeria is a prominent member of the Special Court's Management Committee. 7 If the members of the Management
Committee will not cooperate, why should anyone else? In an94. See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda were established by the U.N. Security Council acting under Ch. VII of the U.N.
Charter. See ICTY Statute, supra note 8; see also ICTR Statute, supra note 9.
95. As the Secretary-General explained in his Report:
The primacy of the Special Court, however, is limited to the national courts of
Sierra Leone and does not extend to the courts of third States. Lacking the
power to assert its primacy over national courts in third States in connection
with the crimes committed in Sierra Leone, it also lacks the power to request
the surrender of an accused from any third State and to induce the compliance of its authorities with any such request. In examining measures to enhance the deterrent powers of the Special Court, the Security Council may
wish to consider endowing it with Chapter VII powers for the specific purpose
of requesting the surrender of an accused from outside the jurisdiction of the
Court.
Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6,
10.
The First Annual Report details a wide range of organizations (from UNAMSIL to Interpol) and issues (from arrest of detainees to relocation of witnesses) involved in cooperation agreements with the Special Court. See First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 19.
96. See Lansana Fofana, Rights - Sierra Leone: War Crimes Trials are Opening Old
Wounds, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Jan. 18, 2005, available at 2005 WL 61722900 (noting that

to date Charles Taylor is "on the run").
97. See BRINGINGJUSTICE, supra note 6, at 39-41. Human Rights Watch states simply

that "Nigeria's harbouring of Taylor goes against international law, undercuts the investment made by the international community to combat impunity in Sierra Leone,
and is an affront to victims of the crimes committed in Sierra Leone." Id. at 39.
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other case where the absence of Chapter VII powers benefited
an indictee, the Court was unable to induce cooperation from
either the ICTY or ICTR to host the initial appearance of one of
the indictees.9 s Sometimes, though, the indictees are the losers:
Foday Sankoh's death in Special Court custody occurred despite
the Registry's stringent efforts to find a State willing to provide
Sankoh with the urgent medical assistance he required."9 Chapter VII powers might not have allowed the Special Court to require a State to render that assistance, but adding to the diplomatic weight of the Court would have made it much harder for
any State to refuse such a request.
International cooperation must cut both ways. The Special
Court has carefully discharged its obligations of cooperation
with other international actors - for example, cooperating with
Sierra Leone authorities when a senior investigator was charged
with serious sexual offenses against a Sierra Leone minor."0 0
The international community cannot expect the Special Court
to behave like a good international citizen - for example, by
not working covertly to secure custody of Taylor - if the members of the community will not, reciprocally, afford the Court
the respect, benefits and cooperation the Court requires. The
problem here is structural: the Special Court was not given the
power to compel cooperation, and so is not receiving it. Chapter VII powers are no panacea, but they certainly send a signal
that the international community is serious about accountability
in a particular situation, and give a tribunal diplomatic clout.
The broader issue is that the standing of international criminal tribunals within the international community - and in particular their ability to draw on the U.N. diplomatic leverage needs to be clarified. Institutional designers in the future must
give this careful consideration. It is not only a question of Chapter VII mandate; other issues, such as the inclusion of diplomatic
expertise in a tribunal's start-up staff, are also implicated. 10 ' The
98. See First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 8.
99. See U.N. Blamed for Sankoh Death, BBC NEWS (U.K), July 31, 2003, available at
http: //news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3112659.stm.
100. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Statement by the Registrar
on Peter Halloran (Aug. 18, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/press/pressrelease081804.pdf.
101. I am indebted to Marieke Wierda for a number of these points. The lack of
diplomatic expertise at the Special Court has been a central charge of the diplomatic
community, especially after the Prosecutor's unsealing of the indictment against
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ad hoc tribunals could draw on the Security Council for the diplomatic maneuverings required to produce compliance; the hybrid
model leaves tribunals with no such diplomatic recourse.
This is not merely an abstract or political concern. It may
have real legal force. If defendants, either independently, or
through the Special Court, are unable - and this is as yet untested - to secure access to exculpatory evidence they reasonably
believe to be in the custody of foreign States or organizations,
what prospect is there for fair trial? The Prosecution narrative in
the CDF case has to date minimized the involvement of
ECOMOG with CDF forces, suggesting that there may be evidence in Nigerian custody that would either exonerate CDF indictees, or at least cast doubt on Prosecution allegations in that
case. Similarly, the links between the RUF and Liberian groups,
and perhaps also Burkina Faso, suggest significant evidence relevant to the RUF case may be located in those jurisdictions. If the
Court cannot gain access to that evidence, will it acquit these
defendants? If it convicts them, without that evidence, will those
convictions be sound? The prospects of the trials failing to secure convictions as a result of a lack of international cooperation
is, therefore, not academic.
The question of international cooperation also touches on a
deeper issue, namely what the implications are for the United
Nations of being involved in both peace and justice enterprises.
Whether through Chapter VII or otherwise, international criminal tribunals have, to date, looked to the United Nations for the
cooperation and enforcement capacity the tribunals themselves
lack. Despite its independence from the United Nations, the
ICC may be similarly reliant upon it, particularly in relation to
the provision of evidence. The two institutions recently approved a Relationship Agreement. 10 2 Among other things, the
Charles Taylor when he was attending peace negotiations in Ghana, which many considered diplomatically naive and unhelpful. For discussion, see, e.g., PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 7-10; Kathy Ward, Might v. Right: Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leone
Special Court, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEr 8 (2003); Cesare P.R. Romano & Andrh Nollkaemper,
The Arrest WarrantAgainst the Liberian President, Charles Taylor, ASIL INSIGHT, June 2003,
available at http://www.asil.org/insight/insighllO.htm. Regardless of the justifiability
of that charge, the inclusion of experienced diplomats in senior tribunal staff may help
avoid such difficulties in the future.
102. See Press Release, Agreement Between the International Criminal Court and
the United Nations (Oct. 4, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/47.html.
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Agreement creates an obligation for the United Nations to cooperate with the ICC, and to provide it with information and documents, subject to a stipulation that the United Nations must have
"due regard to its responsibilities and competence under the
Charter." °3 The Relationship Agreement allows the ICC or the
United Nations to take protective measures where provision of
information to the Court would "endanger the safety or security
of current or former personnel of the United Nations, or otherwise prejudice the security or proper conduct of any operation
' 4 What
or activity of the United Nations."10
remains unclear is
whether the United Nations can refuse to hand over information
or documents requested by the ICC on the basis that to do so
would prejudice existing or future peace-making activities, e.g.,
by undermining the trust of negotiating warring factions. It is
not clear whether that would rise to the level of "prejudice [ing]
...

the proper conduct"'0 ° of that U.N. activity, or whether the

United Nations might refuse to hand over information on the
basis that to do so would be to disregard its peacemaking obligations under the U.N. Charter. Until that question is resolved,
the presumption in favor of information-sharing created by the
new Relationship Agreement may have a markedly chilling effect
on U.N. peacemaking activities as potential interlocutors come
to appreciate that what they say to the United Nations may be
passed onto the ICC Prosecutor. What this signals is broader
tension confronted by the United Nations - made clear by the
question of what role it should play in facilitating cooperation
with international criminal tribunals - between enforcing the
law of war through criminal prosecutions, and standing as a neutral mediator in the bargaining process designed to end a war.
Aligning the United Nations with criminal prosecutions risks undermining perceived legitimacy in the eyes of potential interlocutors. That is increasingly a problem the United Nations faces
not only with the ICC, but also with hybrid tribunals such as the
Special Court.

103. See Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement between the International
Criminal Court and the United Nations, June 7, 2004, art. 15, § 1, available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/Pages from Negotiated DraftRelationshipAgreement
PartI.pdf.
104. Id. art. 15, § 3.
105. Id.
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D. The Affected Population'sPerspective
The Special Court is, first and foremost, and as its very name
suggests, for Sierra Leone. 10 6 The consequences for international criminal justice of the Special Court failing to discharge its
responsibilities to the international community could be grave.
But the primary objective of the international community in establishing the Court was not for the Court to accrue benefits directly, but rather to ameliorate the situation in Sierra Leone,
and reduce the threat to international peace and security that
the situation represented; 10 7 only in doing so would the Court
indirectly benefit from its establishment of a more secure international community and an enhanced system of international
criminal justice. If the Special Court is seen to fail Sierra Leone,
then its primary objective will be unmet, and the hybrid approach to enforcing the law of war must be questioned.
1. Investigation and Prosecution of Those Bearing the
Greatest Responsibility
The Special Court was established to investigate and prosecute those bearing the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law in the conflict in Sierra
Leone since November 1996.108 There is controversy in Sierra
Leone as to whether the Court is adequately discharging this responsibility.'0 9 The controversy turns on two points, one of
which can be discounted here, and one which cannot.
The first point is that many serious violations of IHL occurred prior to November 1996, and that the use of this date the date of signature of the Abidjan Accord"' - to define the
106. Beyond the name, that is also the perception of the people of Sierra Leone.
In a recent opinion poll covering 1,279 respondents throughout Sierra Leone, conducted by the Campaign for Good Governance, 61% of respondents stated that the
Special Court is intended for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Eight percent
thought it was for the benefit of the international community, 5% for the Sierra Leone
Government, 4% for no one, and 22% did not know. See CAMPAIGN FOR GOOD GoVERNANCE, OPINION POLL REPORT ON THE TRC AND SPECIAL COURT 13 (2003) (responses to
Question 37), available at http://www.slcgg.org/opinionpoll.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2005).
107. See S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6, pmbl.,
12-13.
108. See Special Court Agreement, supra note 20, art. 1, § 1.
109. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
110. Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone
and the Revolutionary United Front, Nov. 30, 1996 [hereinafter Abidjan Accord], available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/abidjanaccord.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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commencement of the Special Court's temporal jurisdiction resuits in an arbitrary distinction between those who will be punished and those who will walk free." t ' This is an age-old problem
in international criminal law. It represents the pragmatic political choice made by those who initiate post-conflict accountability
to compromise the ideal of an absolute end to impunity with the
political challenges of securing prosecutions. 1 2 We can discount this concern here because, in effect, it asks whether the
Special Court was the right institution to achieve all the objectives represented by the performance standards identified in Table 1. That is an important question, but not the one I seek to
address here; my concern is rather whether the Special Court is
even managing to achieve the objectives which fall within the
institutional parameters set out by its designers. It may be true
that the November 1996 restriction leads to an inaccurate historical record, or to politicization of the trial process. It may be
true that it was a poor institutional choice. Here, that is not my
concern: my concern is to assess how the Court is performing
within the parameters it has been set, including this limitation
on its temporal mandate.
This leads us to the second point of controversy: what
"those bearing the greatest responsibility" means, both in theory
and, crucially, in practice.
The theoretical debate remains unresolved."' The 2000 Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishment of a Special Court for
111. See Celina Schocken, The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Overview and Recommendations, 20 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 436, 445 (2002); see also Press Release, Amnesty Int'l,
Sierra Leone: The U.N. Security Council Must Make the Special Court Effective and
Viable (Feb. 13, 2001), at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR510012001
(protesting the limit on jurisdiction and suggesting the limit extend to 1991).
112. The basis for the choice of date is explained in the Secretary-General'sReport.
[T]he Secretary-General has been guided by the following considerations: (a)
the temporal jurisdiction should be reasonably limited in time so that the
Prosecutor is not overburdened and the Court overloaded; (b) the beginning
date should correspond to an event or a new phase in the conflict without
necessarily having any political connotations; and (c) it should encompass the
most serious crimes committed by persons of all political and military groups
and in all geographical areas of the country. A temporal jurisdiction limited
in any of these respects would rightly be perceived as a selective or discriminatory justice.
Imposing a temporal jurisdiction on the Special Court reaching back to 1991
would create a heavy burden for the prosecution and the Court.
Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6,

25-26.

113. See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals Beaing the Highest Level of Re-
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Sierra Leone, drafted by the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs (which
had negotiated the text of the Special Court Statute) stated that
the formulation was not designed to limit jurisdiction to leaders,
but to provide guidance in prosecutorial strategy. 1 4 Despite this
apparently authoritative interpretation, one Trial Chamber of
the Special Court has decided otherwise, indicating that the formulation does provide a jurisdictional limitation.1 1 5 The Chamber's decision may appear to play into the hands of the defendants - it offers them an apparent jurisdictional defense, if they
can establish that others bore greater responsibility than they for
the acts alleged; but it also remains litigable.
The central point is, however, a political one: the credibility
of the Court has been negatively affected in some eyes by its
choice of defendants. The criticism comes in four variants.
First, many of those being prosecuted are not the "big fish,"
but at best middle-ranking officers. It is certainly true that four
top defendants have so far escaped justice: Foday Sankoh and
Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie have passed away; Johnny Paul
Koroma, head of the AFRC junta remains an outlaw through covert evasion tactics; and Charles Taylor escapes prosecution by
overt evasion tactics.1 16 Even though this criticism seems to prejudge the issue of whether these individuals do in fact "bear the
greatest responsibility," the infamy of Taylor and Koroma within
sponsibility, 2(2) J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 516 (2004) (discussing these issues in a broader
context).
114. See Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6,
30. The Secretary-General'sReport
specifically argues that, "It must be seen, however, not as a test criterion or a distinct
jurisdictional threshold, but as a guidance to the Prosecutor in the adoption of a prosecution strategy and in making decisions to prosecute in individual cases." Id. It also
advocates for the use of the term "persons most responsible." Id. it 29-31. His recommendation was not adopted in the 2000 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1315. See
Micaela Frulli, The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments, 11 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 857, 862 (2000). See generally S.C. Res. 1315, supranote 6. CompareReport of the
PlanningMission on the Establishment of the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 57th
Sess., Annex, 1 29, U.N. Doc. S/2002/246 (2002) [hereinafter Report of the Planning
Mission], with PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 10 (arguing this may produce
"selective justice" because it is a "highly subjective standard").
115. See Prosecutor v. Fofana, Decision on the Preliminary Defence Motion on the
lack of Personal Jurisdiction on behalf of Accused Fofana, Case No. SCSL-2004-14AR72(E), Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (2004),
21-27 ("the Chamber therefore concludes that the issue of personal jurisdiction is ajurisdictional requirement, and while it
does of course guide the prosecutorial strategy, it does not exclusively articulate
prosecutorial discretion, as the Prosecution has submitted").
116. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 11.
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Sierra Leone means it will be hard for the Court to claim it has
discharged its mandate of prosecuting those who do in fact bear
the greatest responsibility, while they remain at large.11 v
Second, many Sierra Leoneans resent the indictment of the
CDF leaders, particularly Chief Sam Hinga Norman, since many
consider the CDF to have saved the country."1 8 (This explanation ascribes little influence over the outcome of the conflict to
ECOMOG, the United States, the United Kingdom, and private
mercenary groups such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline International.) These critics argue that the CDF does not bear responsibility for committing serious violations of International
Humanitarian Law ("IHL") - they bear responsibility for ending
those violations, 1 9 which were in fact committed by the RUF/
AFRC. Some of these critics argue that the Titoesque policy of
prosecuting all groups equally,1 20 simply allows the international
community to cast all of the combatants as villains, avoiding the
difficult questions that the international community might otherwise confront about its own failure to defend democracy and
1 21
the failure of U.N. interventions in the region.
Like the first critique, this argument seems to prejudge the
issue; there may be evidence of CDF violations of IHL - it is the
point of the trial to assess whether that is so. Regardless, the
indictment of the CDF leaders has irrevocably - and some
would argue needlessly - politicized the Court in many Sierra
Leonean eyes. 12 2 Just as importantly, though, it has also validated
the Court in many other Sierra Leonean eyes. For example, following the arrest of Chief Norman, the National Chairman of
the War-affected Amputees Association said:
117. Id. at 20-21.
118. See PROMISES AND PrrIALLs, supra note 6, at 5-6, n.34.

119. SeeAnnex to the Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (2000). It is notable, in this respect, that the letter sent
by President Kabbah to Secretary-General Annan, which triggered the negotiations that
produced the Court, asked for U.N. assistance in establishing a court to try "members of
the Revolutionary United Front [("RUF")] and their accomplices". Id.
120. SeeJohn R.W.D.Jones, The Gamekeeper-Turned-Poacher'sTale, 2(2)J. Irr'LCRIM.
JUsT. 486, 493 (2004) (detailing the Titoist tactic of prosecuting a Serb for nationalism
one week, a Croat the next, and a Muslim the third).
121. See id. Jones suggests the same approach at the ICTY is, "a way of assuaging
the West's guilt over its failure to intervene in Bosnia. If all sides to the conflict were
equally guilty, then that omission is not so terrible." Id. at 493-94.
122. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 7.
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We are very pleased with actions taken by the Special Court
....
We are the symbol of why this Court was created. We
are the exhibits. Nothing will replace what we have lost. We
know that the Special Court is on the victims' side and12will
make sure that this country is never again under attack.
Third, a smaller group argues that the indictment of the
CDF leaders, particularly Chief Norman, was a political move
orchestrated by the President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, to remove
the threat that Norman and the CDF represented to his powerbase. 1 24 This is ironic, they contend, because Norman was at all
times throughout the conflict answerable to Kabbah. 195 If Norman bears responsibility for serious violations of IHL then, ergo,
Kabbah bears greater responsibility. Quod erat demonstrandum, it
cannot be Norman that bears the greatest responsibility, nor
Fofana or Kondewa, the other CDF defendants, since by the
Prosecution's own admission they were subordinate to Norman.
Similar arguments can in fact be presented with respect to the
RUF and AFRC accused, given the absence of Sankoh, Koroma
and Taylor from the proceedings.
Fourth, other critics argue that the net should be cast
wider.12 6 They suggest that a number of lower-level commanders
- such as AFRC commanders Savage and Al Hadji Bayoh, and
CDF commander MusaJunisa - should be considered as "bearing the greatest responsibility" because of the particularly brutal
nature of their crimes. 12' This is not so much a criticism of the
Prosecutions' choice to indict the existing defendants, but its
choice not to indict others.
These kinds of criticisms follow any attempt to impose postconflict accountability. What is unusual - and perhaps unnecessary - about the notion of "greatest responsibility" is that it
not only acts as a lightning-rod attracting political criticism of
the Court, but that it may - if the prevailing interpretation of
the phrase as a jurisdictional limitation holds - translate that
political criticism into legal forms which brings it within the trial
process, needlessly politicizing it from the inside out. This is not
a feature of hybrid tribunals generally, but instead a result of the
123. Id. at 5-6.
124. See generally id. at 7. See CRYING WITHOUT TEARS, supra note 17, at 6.
125. See CRYING WITHOUT TEARsi supra note 17, at 6.
126. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 5.

127. Id. at 5-6.
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legalistic approach the Special Court has so far taken to the interpretation of its own Statute. What it does highlight, however,
is how fine the line between prosecution and politics is in the
transitional justice setting. That, in turn, re-emphasizes the
questions we saw raised in relation to international cooperation
about the dangers of the United Nations politicizing its peacemaking processes by engaging in post-conflict prosecutions.
2. Improving security and reconciliation
Catch a taxi in Freetown in the late afternoon on a day that
the Court happens to be sitting, and you are likely to hear Krio
and English radio talk-shows

-

perhaps even talk-back -

dis-

cussing the day's events at the Court. The activities of the Court
have entered mainstream public discourse in the country. The
commentary is not always well-informed, not always perfectly accurate, but that is to be expected: in which democracy are the
popular media always well-informed and accurate? As this makes
clear, perhaps the greatest advance achieved by the move to the
"in theater" prosecution of hybrid tribunals is this immediate effect on public discourse within the affected population. The
Court is clearly catalyzing a careful reconsideration of the nature
and causes of the armed conflict that raged in Sierra Leone over
the last decade. For many local commentators, of course, this is
exactly the Court's central disadvantage: it reopens old wounds
just at the time they are beginning to heal, 128 leading to serious
security concerns.
It is probably too early to assess what impact the trials themselves are having on the security situation in Sierra Leone. The
hope of the U.N. Security Council was that "a qredible system of
justice and accountability for the very serious crimes committed
there would end impunity and would contribute to the process
of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace....- 2 9 Perhaps it would even "expedite the pro128. See CAMPAIGN FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 106, at 13, Question 38 (explaining that only 7% of respondents to the Campaign for Good Governance opinion
poll on attitudes toward the TRC and the Special Court thought that the Special Court
will make people relive the past and reopen wounds, making those wounds worse for
them, while 56% thought it would provide justice for all).
129. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6, pmbl., 7. The Court further asserted the need
for "a strong and credible court that will meet the objectives of bringing justice and
ensuring lasting peace." Id. pmbl., 9.
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cess of bringing justice and reconciliation to Sierra Leone and
the region ....
Any trend that tends to undermine the credibility of the trials - some of which are discussed below - may, however, have
a negative impact on both "peace" and "reconciliation," since
the trials might come to be seen by some portions of the population as an unwanted imposition, to be opposed by force. This
was specifically acknowledged by the Secretary-General in July
2004:
Many observers believe that the Special Court trials, which began in June 2004 and are expected to conclude in 2005, may
become a source of instability. It is expected that there may
be an increased risk that elements hostile
to the Court could
13 1
work.
its
disrupt
to
means
violent
use
Johnny Paul Koroma's escape after a failed coup attempt in January 2003, perhaps motivated by the increasing presence of the
Court, suggests these concerns are not theoretical. 13 2 The Court
has also slapped restrictions on Chief Sam Hinga Norman's contact with the outside world on two occasions, after security concerns were raised.13 3 But it is harder to gauge the broader impact of the trials on the general public, and on regional reconciliation. 134 One of the clearest impacts the Court has had on
regional events arose when the Prosecutor announced the indictment of Charles Taylor just as Liberia's factions were entering peace talks.13 5 Those events have received much comment,
130. Id. pmbl.,
12. See Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, U.N.
SCOR, 55th Sess.,
39, Mission Report, U.N. Doc. S/2000/992 (2000) [hereinafter
Report of the Security Council] (reiterating "the importance of the Court for Sierra Leone's long-term reconciliation").
131. Twenty-Second Report, supra note 48, 6. See INTERNATIONAL CIsIS GROUP, SIERRA LEONE: MANAGING UNCERTAINTY 15-17 (Oct. 24, 2001); see also Peter Penfold, Will
Justice Help Peace in Sierra Leone?, SUNDAY OBSERVER, Oct. 20, 2002.

132. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 5-6.
133. See Prosecutor v. Norman, Decision Prohibiting Visits, Case No. SCSL-2004-14,
Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Registrar 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDFdecisions.html; see also Decision Prohibiting Communications and Visits, Prosecutor v.
Norman, Case No. SCSL-03-08-PT-128, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, Registry 2004, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF-decisions.html.
134. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Registrar Visits Liberia (July 16,
2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org (illustrating how the mandate for regional reconciliation has begun to be operationalized, i.e., through outreach work in Liberia.
135. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 7.
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both positive and negative. 13 6 All the same, there are larger institutional aspects of the establishment and operation of the Court
which are having a clear impact on security, 13 7 and these we can
assess.
First, the presence of the Court helps to keep international
attention on Sierra Leone. Trials are media-friendly events.
Coverage of the trials - and of the peace process generally by foreign press and NGOs sustains public opinion and civil society pressures for foreign governments to remain engaged with
the peace process. The fact that two of the chief indictees Koroma and Taylor - remain outside Court custody also indicates that there is a continuing threat to regional peace and security, helping ensure external decision-makers do not "cut and
run." 13 8 In this sense, the trials are complementary to the
United Nations' broader goals of establishing peace and security
in Sierra Leone and the region.
Second, the Court itself has brought significant revenue and
(to a lesser degree) investment into Sierra Leone. That should
be positive for development, and, one might therefore assume,
security; we might think it positive for the United Nations' stabilization goals generally. But the reality is complex and far from
straight-forward. Like a complex peace operation such as the
United Nations' Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL"), which
the Court is not formally a part of, but with which it cooperates
closely, the Court's expenditures tend to be directed at services
controlled by Sierra Leone's merchant class - European-style
restaurants and leisure complexes, leasing residential accommodation, security, construction, and import of office and other
equipment. While the employment by these groups brings significant short-term benefit to those employed - reducing unemployment may also reduce incentives for crime - it is also
clear that the benefits of this foreign investment accrue primarily to the owner-managers, reinforcing their dominant economic position within Sierra Leonean society. In Sierra Leone,
136. Id. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the arrest warrant
against the Liberian President Charles Taylor and the Sierra Leonean Court).
137. See West Africa Report, supra note 93, 1 40 (noting that the Security Council
Mission to West Africa in July 2004 "heard from several interlocutors that the work of
the Special Court had a bearing on Sierra Leone's stability").
138' See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing Koroma and Taylor's
evasion of the Court).
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this problem - often faced in one variety or another by U.N.
peace operations - takes on a particular hue, in light of allegations that a few individuals within this middle class have a strong
hand in the illicit resource extraction industries (particularly the
diamond industry) which lie at the root of Sierra Leone's resource wars. 139 An even smaller subset of the merchant class is
alleged to have strong ties to al Qaeda and perhaps Hizbollah. 14 °
Even disregarding such disturbing claims on the basis of
their difficulty of substantiation, it is clear that a complex, sudden foreign military and reconstruction intervention will stimulate not only formal, but also informal and illicit economic activity in a post-conflict environment. In Sierra Leone, for example,
there is no requirement that UNAMSIL or Special Court salaries
be processed through the Sierra Leone banking system (perhaps
because of fears relating to corruption and financial independence), depriving the government of an obvious source of revenue and liquidity. (Even if salaries were not taxed, their processing through the Sierra Leonean banking system could potentially offer Sierra Leone better borrowing rates on international
financial markets.) Special Court salaries and allowances are
paid in U.S. dollars cash - and almost without fail, changed by
international staff (between 40% and 50% of the Court's staff)
through black-market money-changers, not through the banking
system. (The black market offers both better rates and greater
convenience.) Some expatriate staff also directly and indirectly
encourage other illicit transactions, particularly prostitution and
diamond-trading. Both will have long term economic and security consequences for the country - for example, the stimulation
of prostitution may lead to significant health-care costs and
losses in national productivity through increased infection rates
139. See generally IAN
THE MATrER:

SMILLIE ET AL., PARTNERSHIP AFRICA CANADA, THE HEART OF

SIERRA LEONE, DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY

(2000); Alabji M. S. Bah,

Exploring the Dynamics of the SierraLeone Conflict, 29 (1) PEACEKEEPING & INT'L REL. 1 (Jan.Apr. 2000); THE DIAMONDS AND HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT, DIAMOND INDUSTRY ANNUAL
REVIEW, SIERRA LEONE 2005 (Feb. 2005).
140. See AI-Qaida, African Diamond Link Confirmed, BLANKA DIAMONDS NEWS, Dec.

29, 2002, available at http://www.blankadiamonds.be/news/02_12_29.html; see also
Glenn R. Simpson, UN Ties Al Qaeda Figure to Diamonds, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2004.
Following U.S. moves to freeze al Qaeda assets following the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
embassy bombings in 1998, al Qaeda apparently moved to sink its funds into diamonds,
operating through diamond smuggling networks with connections to Charles Taylor,
the RUF, and Hizbollah. Later, Taylor apparently harbored at least two al Qaeda operatives following the September 11, 2001 attacks. See id.
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of sexually transmitted diseases (especially HIV-AIDS). At the
same time, other expatriate staff privately undertake private economic initiatives such as financing local children's upkeep and
education.
The point here is not that the staff of the Special Court engage in such activity any more or less than other foreigners carrying out other functions as part of the United Nations presence
there. There is nothing beyond anecdotal evidence to make any
such assessment. Rather, the point is that the Court effectively
exists as part of such a complex intervention, and that it is inevitably perceived by the affected population as a central element
of that intervention. In assessing the contribution of the Court
to security and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, we must take all
these complex impacts - better understood in the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping fields - into account. This
requires more than simply stimulating greater dialogue between
practitioners and commentators in the international criminal
justice and peacekeeping fields to better understand the logistical challenges faced by in-theater prosecutions, and the impacts
those prosecutions may have on local communities. It also requires a very careful reflection on how a prosecution in-theater
may feed back into the prosecutorial and judicial process, with
complex ramifications for peace and security. The issue at stake
here is whether by adopting a "hybrid" model we not only encourage positive intermixing of international and domestic elements, but also facilitate the politicization of international criminal trials and undermine broader stabilization objectives. The
question is whether hybrid tribunals contribute to the marriage
of peace and justice, or instead set them against each other. The
Special Court may shed light on answers to this question. Considering the role of "local" lawyers before the Court and examining national politics reveals the complexity of the issues. 4 The
inclusion of local lawyers in every aspect of the judicial process
-

including Prosecution, Defense, and on the Bench -

is

touted as a central advantage of the hybrid model, offering local
nuance, knowledge, and legitimacy to the trial process while the
international community provides an opportunity for education
141. The relationships detailed in the discussion which follows are only the tip of
the iceberg. Desmond Da Silva QC, a Deputy Prosecutor, was, for example, a defense
counsel in a 1967 treason trial in which Chief Norman, among others, was tried. Judge
Gelaga King also served in the same trial.
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and up-skilling of the local legal profession. 14 2 "Local" lawyers
bring the history and politics of local institutions to the Special
Court trial process.1 4 3 Charles Margai, lead Defense Counsel for
CDF defendant Allieu Kondewa, 1 44 is a long-term political rival
4 5 of cowithin the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party ("SLPP")'
defendant Sam Hinga Norman. The third defendant, Moinina
Fofana, is represented, inter alia, by Arrow Bockarie,146 a powerful SLPP figure in Bo district, a key SLPP constituency. Norman
himself now has, as Assigned Counsel, another key SLPP figure,
Dr. Bu-Buakei Jabbi. The key position of SLPP leadership
figures in legal advocacy roles in the CDF case is not surprising,
given the close ties between the SLPP and the CDF and the historical overlap of legal and political elites in Sierra Leone.1 4 7 Approximately seventy percent of Sierra Leoneans are illiterate.' 4 8
Consequently, an educated, wealthy upper class, which uses the
institutions of the State - including the law - to maintain the
status quo, easily dominates society. As a result, there has been
no clear separation, either in the colonial or post-colonial peri1 49
ods, of the legal and political professional classes.
The interplay between this advocacy before the Special
Court and national politics is little discussed in the international
community, however. Representing these figures before the
Special Court means defending them from charges brought by a
Court established at the request of President Kabbah, the leader
of the Defense Counsel's own political party. Legal advocacy decisions thus become imbued with political ramifications. The
most striking decision occurred when certain SLPP lawyers,
along with other Special Court defense counsel, alleged before
the Sierra Leone Supreme Court that Kabbah's establishment of
the Special Court violated the Sierra Leone Constitution since it
142. Cf BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 36-37.
143. Id.
144. SeeJune 3, 2004 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Trial Chamber I 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
Transcripts/CDF-060304.pdf [hereinafter Norman I].
145. President Kabbah currently heads the Sierra Leone People's Party ("SLPP").
146. See Norman I, June 3, 2004 Transcript, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T.
147. SeeJoE A.D. ALIE, A NEW HISTORY OF SIERRA LEONE 80-81, 224-55 (1990).
148. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK: SIERRA LEONE, available at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos/sl.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
149. See ALI, supra note 147. Unsurprisingly, the medical and journalistic professions also played key roles, as did the clergy. See id.
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purported to alter the structure of judicial power within the
country without the necessary recourse to referendum.1 5 ° The
"constitutional case" represents more than legal maneuvering it represents an important phase in the shifting network of personal and political alliances that make up Sierra Leone national
politics.

51

The ad hoc tribunals have already encountered the dangers
that arise when local legal representation imports domestic political struggles into the trial process. Hybrid tribunals may risk
exacerbating that danger by increasing the presence of local legal professions within the judicial process. 15 2 Why is it difficult
to admit that local lawyers' connections to weakened, perhaps
even corrupted, local political and legal institutions may be a liability for the Court while it is easy to admit that their local knowledge is an asset for the Court? After all, it is the very weakness of
those institutions that has lead to the need for an international
presence to enforce the law of war. The challenge is to understand the full complexity of these interactions and to take them
into account in design and resourcing decisions.
The Court's complex interaction with domestic political
processes has also played out in its relationship with the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC"). The two institutions
were established separately.1 5 3 Initially, many commentators
worried that the looming trials at the Special Court would discourage potential witnesses from testifying before the TRC, fearing incrimination.' 5 4 As early as October 2000, commentators
150. Section 108(3) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone requires that amendments
to specified sections of the Constitution occur through referendum. The sections covered include those pertaining to the judicial power of the Republic. See SIERA LEONE
CONST. § 108(3).
151. On the SLPP aspects of these cases, see PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6,
at 6-7.
152. In its recent report on the Special Court, Human Rights Watch commented
that at the end of the conflict, "[c]orruption and political manipulation plagued the
judiciary." BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 1. If that analysis held true of the broader
legal profession, and notjust the judiciary, then the risk of that corruption tainting the
Special Court's processes is clear.
153. See FIRST EIGHTEEN MONTHS, supra note 47, at 1, 11.
154. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMIS-

(2002), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/04/sierraleoneTRC0418.
htm; see also Briefing Paper, Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice Special Court Task Force, Relationship Between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Jan. 7-18, 2002), available at http://www.specialcourt.org/docSION
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noted "the negative impact of the establishment and jurisdiction
of the Court on the minds of ex-combatants who could be more
reluctant to come forward to disarm for fear of prosecution. "155
This fear was significantly reduced when David Crane, Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, announced that he
would not use such TRC testimony.1 56 The Special Court and
No Peace WithoutJustice conducted an extensive outreach campaign to ensure that any remaining risk of deterrence did not
materialize. At that point, the relationship appeared positive.
In December 2001 and January 2002, the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of Legal
Affairs convened a Group of Experts to discuss the relationship
between the institutions. 157 It suggested that while the institutions remain independent, they should cooperate to set priorities.15 ' That guidance clearly failed to hit home.1 5 9 In October
2003, the Court responded to requests by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for access to Special Court detainees in order to conduct public hearings with veiled derision (although
limited access was ultimately granted, on the Court's terms)"6 °
uments/PlanningMission/BriefingPapers/SLGovTRC_-SpCtRelationship.doc; William
A. Schabas, The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts: The Case
of SierraLeone, 25 HuM. RTS. Q. 1035 (2003), available at http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/
human-rights-quarterly/v025/25.4schabas.html;

MARIEKE

WIERDA ET AL.,

INTERNA-

TIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, EXPLORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
SPECIAL COURT AND THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

COMMISSION OF SIERRA LEONE

(2002), available at http://www.ictj.org/downloads/TRCSpecialCourt.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2005); Abdul Tejan-Cole, The Complementary and Conflicting Relationship Between
the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 6 YALE HUM.
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 139 (2003).
155. Report of the Security Council supra note 130, 40.
156. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor,
TRC Chairman and Special Court Prosecutor Join Hands to Fight Impunity (Dec. 10,
2002), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/prosecutor-121002.htrml.
157. See Report of the Planning Mission, supra note 114,
51.
158. See id. 7 48-56.
159. One Court official has indicated that the lack of Special Court representation
in the group made the group reticent to press its recommendations upon the Court
without its consent. See E-mail from Allison Cooper & Giorgia Tortora, Special Court
Officials, to James Cockayne,
15 (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with author).
160. See Decision Prohibiting Communications and Visits, Prosecutor v. Norman,
Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Special Ct. for Sierre Leone (Trial Chamber I 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF-decisions.html; see also Decision on Appeal by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone ("TRC" or "The Commission") and
Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr. Justice
Bankole Thompson Delivered on 29 October 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to Hold
a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga NormanJP, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No.
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In his decision on appeal, Judge Robertson even characterized
the TRC's proposed hearings as an "uncontrolled environment"
which might unleash "unpredictable trouble."1 6 ' Further, Judge
Robertson described the proposed hearings as a spectacle in
which the accused would be
paraded, in the very court where the trial will shortly be held,
before a Bishop rather than a presiding judge .... The event
will have . . . the appearance of a sort of trial familiar from
centuries past, although the first day of uninterrupted testimony 2may resemble more a very long party political broad16
cast.
The litigation demonstrated the lack of coordination and rocky
(diplomatically described as "cordial" in the First Annual Report)' 6 3 relationship between the two institutions - not a recipe
for maximizing their mutual benefits. 1 64 The outcome, however,
did ensure that the detainees had limited access to the TRC process (and vice versa) and that the integrity of the judicial process
was maintained. When the TRC issued its Final Report in October 2004, however, it was damning of the Special Court:
Sierra Leone, with its two institutions of transitional justice in
operation at the same time ... had the opportunity to offer
the world a unique framework in moving from conflict to
peace. Sadly, this opportunity was not seized. The two bodies
had little contact and when they intersected at the operational level, the relationship was a troubled one.... The failure to clearly demarcate the roles and functions of the two
bodies, together with the highly uncertain nature of the relationship between them, led to a great deal of confusion in the
minds of the public ....
The Commission finds that many
Sierra Leoneans who might have wished to participate in the
truth telling process stayed away for fear that their information may be turned over to the Special Court.... The Commission's ability to create a forum of exchange between victims and perpetrators was retarded by the presence of the
SCSL-2003-08-PT, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (President's Decision 2003), available at
http://www.sc-sl.org/CDF-decisions.html [hereinafter TRC Appeal].
161. TRC Appeal, Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT,
26.
162. Id. 1 30.
163. See First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 6.
164. See generally Jayne Huckerby, Requests by Truth and Reconciliation Commissions for Public Hearings of Indictees: The Chief Hinga Norman Case and its Implications (Fall 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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Special Court ....
The Commission finds that the "Practice
Direction" formulated by the Registry of the Special Court to
regulate contact between the Commission and the detainees
did not adequately consider the spirit and purpose behind
the Commission's mandate ....
By removing the decision
from the detainees, their rights under the Commission's Act
were effectively proscribed ....
The decision to deny Chief
Hinga Norman and the other detainees their right to appear
before the Commission represents an impairment, not only
to the detainees but also to the people of Sierra Leone. In
practice, the decision of the President of the Special Court:
a. rejected the right of the detainees to testify in an
open and transparent manner before the Commission;
b. denied the detainees their freedom of expression
and their right to appear publicly before the Commission;
c. denied the right of the Sierra Leonean people to see
the detainees participate in the truth and reconciliation process. . . . The Commission holds that the
right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be
upheld in terms of national and international law. It
is the reaching of the wider truth through broadbased participation that permits a [N]ation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures
to prevent a repetition of the past. 6 5
The Report was particularly damning of the United Nations' failure to set down more detailed guidelines regarding how the two
institutions should interact and how to protect the rights of detainees. 1 1 6 It also suggested that by establishing a Special Court
that had partially overturned the validity of the amnesty granted
by the Lom6 Agreement, the United Nations "may have sent an
unfortunate message to combatants in future wars that they cannot trust peace agreements that contain amnesty clauses."1 6 7 As
we have seen, this may in the context of ICC prosecutions and
the U.N.-ICC Cooperation Agreement have important long-term
ramifications for the willingness of belligerents to engage in
U.N. peace-making processes. More broadly, the tense relation165.
(Oct. 28,
166.
167.

Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Final Report,
2004).
See id.
564-65.
Id. 562.

1

558-73
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ship between the TRC and the Special Court may signal policymakers to carefully calibrate such institutions to ensure that they
provide complementary, rather than competing, processes. The
need to ensure that the two institutions present reinforcing,
rather than mutually undermining, historical narratives of the
conflict at hand, in order to generate one'unified (if plural),
accurate, and impartial historical record is especially clear.
3. Accurate and Impartial Record
In the previous Section I discussed the major success of the
Special Court in stimulating Sierra Leonean public discourse on
the nature and causes of the conflict. To assess the success of
the Special Court, it is equally important to examine whether the
Court is providing an accurate and impartial historical record.
Early observations of the trial process suggest that the Court may
be falling short on this front, although there may still be time to
remedy the situation. Some of the reasons for that shortfall may
be peculiar to the Special Court - such as prosecutorial practice - but others may be more structural and, therefore, bear on
longer-term considerations.
To date, the major concern in this respect at the Special
Court is that the historical narrative presented thus far by the
Prosecution - in its opening statements, indictments, pre-trial
briefs, and witness examinations - offers an un-nuanced and,
some would argue, politically skewed reading of the last decade's
events. This concern develops three ways. First, critics suggest
that the Prosecution understates the role of ECOMOG, private
mercenary groups including Executive Outcomes and Sandline,
external assistance from the United Kingdom and United States,
and the pivotal controlling role of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, in its
account of the conflict. Second, critics point to the black-andwhite rhetoric of Chief Prosecutor David Crane, a former U.S.
Judge Advocate, since it seems to over-simplify the complex,
shifting dynamics of the conflict. International Crisis Group
raised this concern as early as August 2003, pointing to the Indictments and public comments by Crane that seemed to oversimplify the conflict into one motivated by, in his own words,
"pure greed," the desire "to control a commodity
diamonds." 6 ' In Crane's own assessment, he had "never seen a
168. Interview by Fred de Sam Lazaro with David Crane, Prosecutor of the Special
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more black and white situation in my life, of good versus evil."'' 69
As International Crisis Group rightly assessed, this over-simplification of the root causes of the conflict - ignoring factors such
as corruption, the mismanagement of State institutions, military
non-accountability, an alienated youth, under-development, and
poverty - risks-undermining the credibility of the proceedings
in the eyes of many Sierra Leoneans. 17 ° Despite this criticism,
Crane's rhetoric has remained rigid and Manichean. 7 ' In his
opening statement at the CDF trial, he spoke of a
path ... strewn with the bones of the dead, the mourns of the
mutilated, the cries of agony of the tortured echoing down
into the valley of death below.... The jackals of death, destruction and inhumanity are caged behind bars of hope and
reconciliation.... [T] hat beast of impunity... howls in frustration2 and shrinks from the bright and shiny spectre of the
law.

17

The next month, opening the Prosecution's case in the RUF
trial, Crane described "a tale of horror, beyond the gothic into
the realm of Dante's inferno. They came across'the border, dark
shadows, on a warm spring day, 23 March of 1991.... These
dogs of war, these hounds from hell . ... 17' This time, Crane
met with repeated objections from Defense counsel who argued
that his rhetoric went beyond a summary of the alleged facts into
a non-probative, prejudicial opinion. Their objections were sustained on many occasions, casting a pall over the opening of the
Prosecution's case.
Third, critics also suggest the Prosecution has strongly overstated the connections between the combatants and particular
foreign groups, especially Libya and al Qaeda. As the International Crisis Group noted in August 2003, the inclusion in the
indictments of a reference to Colonel Mu'ammar Gadhafi as a
Court for Sierra Leone, Religion & Ethics News Weekly (Jan. 10, 2003), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/week619/cover.html.
169. PROMISES AND PrrFALLs, supra note 6, at 14 (quoting David Crane at a press

conference in Freetown on March 18, 2003).
170. See id.
171. See, e.g., Norman I, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Special Ct. for Sierre Leone, at 6
(Trial Chamber I 2004); July 5, 2004 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-0415-T, Special Ct. of Sierre Leone at 19 (Trial Chamber 12004), availableat http://www.
sc-sl.org/Transcripts/RUF-070504a.pdf.
172. Norman I, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, at 6.
173. Id. at 19.
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force behind the RUF, "although factually correct, is disturbing
because it is highly selective in a manner that adds to popular
perceptions of a hidden agenda." '7 4 Leaks from the Office of
the Prosecutor to the Wall StreetJournaldisclosing evidence that
the Office had collected of al Qaeda activities in the region1 7
gave the impression that the Office is, at worst, providing a staging-base for U.S. intelligence operations in the region, and at
best being used to promote American foreign policy in the region." 6 Whether either impression is or is not justified is not
the central point here: the fact is that the leak was bound to
undermine the Court's legitimacy in the eyes of the local popula177
tion.
None of these factors assist in persuading the Sierra Leonean population that the Special Court is there to create an
impartial record for them. Still, there may be sufficient time left
to correct that trend. The defense interventions at the commencement of the RUF trial served to remind us that that the
responsibility for accurate historical reporting is shared by all the
organs of the Court - defense included. 178 The Bench must
carry the burden of the responsibility for the creation of a final,
impartial historical record in the final judgment, but events have
already served to emphasize that a particular responsibility accrues to the Prosecution from the fact that they are given the
174. PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supranote 6, at 16. The notable omission is any reference to the financing and material assistance provided to the RUF and Charles Taylor
by Blaise Campaor6 of Burkina Faso. See id.
175. See Simpson, supra note 140 (detailing a "dossier" held by the Office of the
Prosecutor indicating that Aafia Siddiqui, "al Qaeda's only female leader," travelled to
Monrovia in June 2001 for diamond-smuggling purposes, and quotes Crane, on the
record, as saying that "al Qaeda is in West Africa and has been for years").
176. See PROMISES AND PITFALLs, supra note 6, at 14-15 (discussing how Prosecutor
Crane's presence has affected the critic's view of the Special Court). The U.S. Department of State however, was apparently as surprised as everyone else when the indictment of Charles Taylor was announced, belying claims that Crane is an agent of U.S.
foreign policy. See id. at 15 (mentioning the tension arising between Crane and the U.S.
Department of State following Taylor's indictment). The leaks contradicted Crane's
earlier assurances to International Crisis Group that his office "is not looking at alQaeda." Id. at 17.
177. See id. (stating that the suspicions of U.S. involvement, while implausible, are
nevertheless prevalent among Sierra Leoneans).
178. See, e.g., Decision on the Defence Preliminary Motion on Defects in the Form
of the Indictment, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-03-05, Special Ct. of Sierra Leone
(Trial Chamber I 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-03-05-PT074.pdf.
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first opportunity to present their case. 179 This initial presentation can create a lasting impression which may significantly influence public perception of the tribunal, cooperation with it, and
perhaps even the political and security dynamics within a fragile
post-conflict environment. Second, the difficulty for the Bench
in producing an authoritative record is increased by the presence of a competing historical narrative, such as that recently
provided by the TRC. 8 0 How the Court will choose to deal with
that narrative, built from a deep and extensive engagement with
victims, in particular, remains to be seen. 1 '
4. Respect for Victims' Rights
The protections afforded victims and witnesses by international criminal tribunals are growing increasingly sophisticated. 8 2 The Special Court, despite its small size and budget, is
proving to be no exception to that developmental trajectory,
presenting important advances in the treatment of child witnesses and witness protection in the theatre of the alleged
crimes.1 8 3 There have been occasional lapses - including the
occasion on which the Presiding Judge in the CDF trial asked a
protected witness the name of his brother, which would, if answered, have revealed the witness' identity. 18 4 Overall, however,
179. SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. PROC. & EVID. R.85(A)(i).

180. See Report of the PlanningMission, supra note 114, at 10-11 (describing the relationship between the Special Court and the TRC).
181. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE SIERRA LEONE SPECIAL COURT AND TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (2002)
available at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/04/sierraleoneTRC0418.htm (last visited
Feb. 14, 2005) (describing the depth and emotionally charged nature of witness testimony to the TRC).
182. See generally BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 29-31.
183. See generally id.
184. The witness in question had been granted protected status by the Trial Chamber, meaning that he was to remain anonymous to the public, though not to the parties.
The session was open to the public, with the witness shielded from public view. At the
end of questions by the parties, the following exchange occurred:
Mr President: I have one question for that witness. He said his brother was
killed, what is the name of that brother?
Mr Caruso [for the Prosecution]: Your Honour, may I just make one comment? That name will, of course, identify this witness.
Mr President: Is that so?
Mr Caruso: I believe so.
Mr President: Alright.
June 15, 2004 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Special Ct. of
Sierra Leone at 65-66 (Trial Chamber I 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Tran-
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this is one area that the Special Court is perceived by the stake85
holder group in question to have performed relatively well.'
Perhaps too well. There is a very real concern that respect
for victim witnesses has been taken so far at the Special Court
that it is harming the rights of another stakeholder group - the
defendants. 86 That perception arises from the recently revealed
practice of the Office of the Prosecutor of reimbursing Prosecution witnesses for the expenses they incur while dealing with
Prosecutors and testifying before the Court. i" 7 This is highly
controversial, because it creates the impression that the witnesses are being paid for their testimony, undermining the reliability of that testimony - and more broadly, that the United Nations is aligning itself with one particular interest or political
group within the country.1 8 8 The sums involved are in comparison to average earnings in Sierra Leone, which sits at the bottom
of the United Nations Development Programme's ("UNDP")
Human Development Index, significant.1 8 9 It is precisely to
avoid this apparent exchange of "cash for convictions" (as one
Defense counsel described it) that the Victims and Witnesses
Unit (or its equivalent), housed within the Registry, has traditionally handled these payments.' 90 The OTP has arguably
transgressed the Special Court's rules; 1 the remedy for this
scripts/CDF-060304.pdf. Human Rights Watch also details an incident in which an
AFRC insider witness was "nearly beaten to death," apparently after he "ignored admonishments to stay inside his safe house by Protection Unit staff." BPINGINGJUSTICE, supra
note 6, at 31.
185. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
186. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
187. See MICHELLE STAGGS & SARA KENDALL, WAR CRIMES STUDY CENTER, SPECIAL
COURT MONITORING PROGRAM UPDATE #3 (Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://socrates.
berkeley.edu/-warcrime/weeklyupdate.htm (noting the practice of the Office of the
Prosecutor offering compensation for testimony) [hereinafter PROGRAM UPDATE #3).
188. See id. (detailing the Defense's questioning of the practice of compensation).
189. CompareMICHELLE STAGGS & SARA KENDALL, WAR CRIMES STUDIES CENTER, SPE-

#6 (Oct. 8, 2004) available at http://socrates.berkeley.
edu/-warcrimes/weeklyupdate.htm, with UNDP Human Development Index (2001),
available at http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/pdf/hdr03-table_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (noting that one witness made over U.S.$90,000, which is staggering
considering that Sierra Leone is ranked last among 175 Nations for human development, a ranking that factors in GDP per capita) [hereinafter PROGRAM UPDATE #6].
190. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004). Similar practices have,
apparently - and controversially - occurred at the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda. See id.
191. SPECIAL CT. FOR SIERRA LEONE R. PROC. & EVID. R.34. This rule provides that
the Witnesses and Victims Section provided for by the Special Court's Statute shall supCIAL COURT MONITORING UPDATE
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transgression is not yet clear, but will almost certainly provide
the basis for strong Defense attacks on witness credibility in
cross-examination, and perhaps for appeals of convictions based
on this evidence. 19 2 More uncertain is the broader relationship
between the Court and non-witness victims. Exactly what legacy
it will leave them seems unclear.
5. Legacy Creation
One of the benefits which advocates of the hybrid tribunal
model claimed would flow from the adoption of that model was
a strong "legacy" in the Nation in which they operate, including
improved infrastructure, respect for the rule of law and trust in
public institutions, and improved professional standards. 9 3 Establishing the Court, the U.N. Security Council referred specifically to 'the pressing need for international cooperation to assist
in strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone ... "194
At the same time, whether legacy creation is a "core task" of
the Special Court has remained disputed. 19 5 It remains unclear
- even at this advanced stage of the Court's operation - how
the Court is expected to prioritize "legacy" creation in relation
to its other tasks, or, in other words, how to reconcile its justice
96
mandate with its peace and reconciliation mandate.
port witnesses. The established practice at both the Special Court and the ad hoc tribunals has been for that section, which falls within the Registry, to reimburse witnesses for
their expenses. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Enclosure, art. 16(4)
at 26-27, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), as amended Jan. 16, 2002; ICTR R. PROC. &
EVID. R.34(a); ICTY R. PROC. & EVD. R,34(a). Payments directly from the parties have
not been standard practice, precisely because they taint the reliability of evidence. See
Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses and Expert Witnesses, Case No. SCSL04-14-T-150, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (July 16, 2004) (on file with author) (noting
that Article 2(B) states: "[T]he Witnesses and Victims Section shall ensure the payment
of all allowances"). The PracticeDirection provides a model of transparency for payments
to witnesses, but unfortunately came after the controversy over Prosecution payments
had arisen. It is anticipated that further litigation on this point will occur at the Special
Court. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
192. See PROGRAM UPDATE #6, supra note 189. It should also be noted that the
PracticeDirection permits the same payments to be made to Defence witnesses. See Practice Direction on Allowances for Witnesses and Expert Witnesses, Case No. SCSL-04-14T-150 Special Ct for Sierra Leone (Jul. 16, 2004). None have yet been requested or
made. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
193. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 36-38 (highlighting the hopes for the
Special Court's legacy).
194. S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 6, at pmbl.,
11.
195. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
196. Compare Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 191, at 21-
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That balancing act is made even more difficult by the realization of the complexities involved in legacy creation. Even
those remnants of the Court which would seem obviously to provide a positive legacy to Sierra Leone may bring hidden costs.
One of the most commonly cited "legacies" of the Court is the
brand new 11.5-acre Court compound, 9 7 even if it remains unclear how the compound will be used when the Court leaves.1 98
The hidden costs of the compound include its maintenance and
security. This matches the pattern, described in an earlier section, 19 9 of a complex economic and security legacy produced by
the Court that goes unnoticed by a spectator international community.
Another widely cited legacy of the Court is rule of law reform. 20 0 However as a recent report by the UNDP and the International Center for Transitional Justice ("ICTJ") entitled The
"Legacy" of the Special Court for Sierra Leone2 0° pointed out, a positive legacy is not a self-fulfilling prophecy, but must be carefully
designed and produced. That Report advocated the following
three key legacy projects, all of which might have positive impacts for rule of law concerns: substantive reform of Sierra Leonean law; a strategic professional development program; and
raising awareness of the Court as a rule of law exemplar.20 2 The
expected results of these interlocking projects were named as
the following: updated and improved laws; availability of skills
29, with BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 33-35 (exemplifying the dichotomy between
trying those most responsible and providing outreach services to Sierra Leoneans).
197. See, e.g., Secretary-General'sReport, supra note 6, 61; West Africa Report, supra
note 93, 37; Rule of Law, supra note 4, 44; PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 19;
First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 28. But see INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRtANSiTIONALJUSTICE, DRAFr FOR DISCUSSION: THE "LEGACY" OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA

LEONE 5, 12 (Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.icg.org/downloads/LegacyReport.pdf [hereinafter DRAFT LEGACY REPORT].
198. One interesting proposal is for the compound to become a regional training
centre on human rights and humanitarian law, aiming to bring together foreign experts, local academics and regional human rights lawyers, the NGO community, and
military and government personnel, into a research and training facility. An earlier
suggestion, that the compound operate as a regional outpost for the ICC, appears to
have been scotched by an ICC policy decision to hold all trials for the foreseeable future in The Hague. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
199. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
200. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 32; see also First Annual Report, supra
note 40, at 3, 28 (emphasizing rule of law reform as the Court's legacy).
201. DRAFr LEGACY REPORT, supra note 197.
202. See id. at 1-2, 13-18 (outlining the goals for a legacy of the Special Court).
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training and development opportunities for judges, lawyers, investigators, court administrators and prison guards; and an increased public awareness and dialogue about criminal processes
and the role they fulfill in post-conflict societies.2 0 3 Unfortunately, few formal steps appear to have been taken to realize any
of these projects.2 °4
Much of the rhetorical support for "legacy" creation, both
within the Court and from external commentators, appears either not to appreciate the complexity of the notion, or not to
translate into a willingness to provide nuanced plans of action
for realization of the notion. 2 5 That is despite the increased expectations of an affected population much more "present" in the
workings of the Court than those of the ad hoc tribunals. 20 6 The
interactions between the Court and its staff, on the one hand,
and the affected population, on the other hand are often overwhelmingly positive,20 7 however it is also undeniable that there is
a distinct sense of separation, of isolation of the Court and its
staff from the realities of day-to-day life in the country. It takes
on concrete form in the high walls around the Court compound
and the Nigerian troops wielding aging machine-guns; the Court
staff whisked through the teeming rain in air-conditioned white,
four wheel drives while the local population walks by; the islands
203. See id. at 2. Human Rights Watch has pointed out the importance of Special
Court engagement with domestic prosecutions to broaden the impact of accountability
in Sierra Leone. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 37-38.
204. The Special Court in fact declined to publicly support the report, indicating
that the steps envisaged were ones it had already undertaken or that fell outside its
mandate. See Author's correspondence with Special Court Official (Sept. 2004) (on file
with author). One exception where further steps have been taken is perhaps the "rule
of law awareness" component, which has received significant attention through the
Court's Outreach program. See DRA.Fr LEGACY REPORT, supra note 197, at 17. While no

systematic law reform processes have been initiated through the Court, to this author's
knowledge, there have been occasional forays into this territory, for example the half-

day workshop on death penalty reform held on August 4, 2004, organized largely out of
the Defence Office. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004). Human Rights
Watch also refers to plans and steps being taken to train local police to create a domes-

tic witness protection unit to provide ongoing protection to Special Court witnesses,
itself a form of capacity-building. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supranote 6, at 31, 36. The First
Annual Report also highlights plans to create internships for Sierra Leone university
graduates. See First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 28.
205. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 6-10.

206. ICTJ and UNDP characterise this as a lack of ownership of the Court process
by the local population and a lack of access. See DRAFr LEGACY REPORT, supra note 197,
at 12.
207. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
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of light in ex-pat compounds surrounded by a sea of darkness
when the power to the city cuts out.20 8 All of these measures are
necessary to attract and protect the staff needed to make the
Court real, but they bring social and psychosocial costs, not assisted by the judicial decisions of the Court - however legally
correct and practically advisable in the long-term - asserting its
primacy over local courts and its separation from the Sierra Leonean legal system 20 and its characterization of local institutions such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in disparaging terms. 210
All of these issues are ones which the humanitarian and
peacekeeping community has long confronted - but they take
on a particular cast in the context of criminal justice, especially
when one begins to discuss notions of "legacy". The architects of
future tribunals must realize that a sense of separation from the
affected population is inevitable for foreign interventions generally, perhaps even more so for Courts, with their distinctly legal
culture and space, and that steps must be taken simply to connect with that stakeholder group, let alone to leave it with a positive legacy, rather than a legacy of bitterness and resentment. It
goes without question that the significant, professional Outreach
program 2 11 and the increasingly effective Public Affairs program 2 12 run by the Court have done a very great deal to achieve
the sense of connection that is needed for the Court's purpose;
but the kinds of measures the ICTJ and UNDP outlined 213 are
also needed, if that is to translate into a broader social transformation agenda.
Perhaps the broader point, though, is that courts are not
well designed to carry out such agendas. 2 14 That is the task of
208. See Author's Observations While in Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
209. See Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v. KalIon, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-PT-035, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber) (2004), 11 49, 52, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-2004-14-PT035-II.pdf (stating that "the Special Court is not part of the Judiciary of Sierra Leone,"
and that, "the Special Court for Sierra Leone is established outside the national court
system").
210. Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
211. See generally BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 33-35, (detailing recent cuts to
Outreach funding).
212. See id. at 35.
213. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
214. See DRAFTLEGACY REPORT, supra 197, at I (identifying the impossibility of the
mere presence of the Special Court to achieve such legacy goals).
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other elements of a complex peace operation like UNAMSIL 15
We should not expect criminal tribunals to solve such complex
problems, and given the review undertaken in this section, we
should not, perhaps, be surprised if they tend to exacerbate
some of these problems. Hybrid tribunals face all sorts of challenges, as a result of operating in a theater recently emerged
from war, which the ad hoc tribunals have not faced. In some
ways, then, we should expect them to be able to achieve less,
dollar for dollar, than we expect ad hoc tribunals to achieve. Yet
the reality is that we expect them to achieve more, with less.
That is not sustainable. Either we give them more - more
money, more security, more time, more support - or we lower
our expectations. Doing neither is only a recipe for disappointment - not only the disappointment of the international community but also, and perhaps more importantly, of affected
populations.
E. The Defendants' Perspective
There is one last stakeholder group to whom the Special
Court owes responsibilities: the defendants. The defendants'
perspective on an international criminal tribunal is an important
one, not least because it may help us to appreciate whether a
tribunal is producing justice, or simply convictions. Beyond
overall concerns about the legitimacy and legality of the process
as a whole, the defendants' interests relate specifically to detention and fair trial standards.2 1 6
1. Detention
The detention conditions of the detainees in Freetown are
respectable. By all accounts, they are a vast improvement on the
conditions in which the detainees were held on Bonthe Island,
when they were first arrested. 2 17 The length of pre-trial deten215. See United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone ("UNAMSIL"), Mandate, at http://
www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/mandate.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005)
(denoting UNAMSIL's mandate as it is described and revised in various Security Councilresolutions).
216. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (June-Aug. 2004).
217. The detainees were originally held in a renovated prison on Bonthe Island
because of security concerns around detention in Freetown. See FIRST EIGHTEEN
MONTHS, supra note 47, at 3 (noting the nature of the detention facility at Bonthe Island).
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tion is, similarly, a marked improvement on the ad hoc tribunals:
the majority of Special Court defendants have been brought to
trial within eighteen months of their arrest. 218 There are some
areas in which detention conditions might be improved to bring
them better in line with the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules on the
Treatment of Prisoners, for example by ending the practice of
"slopping out,"219 and perhaps also by improving the training of
staff involved in visitor searches.2 20 Overall, though, the Court
has achieved respectable detention standards in a remarkably
short time.
2. Fair and Expeditious Trial
The final baseline against which the Court's performance
must be measured is that of fair and expeditious trial. If trials
are perceived to be unfair, including as a result of tardiness, the
entire process will be tainted, and seen as a failure - not only by
the defendants, but perhaps even more generally.
I have already touched on the speediness with which much
of the Court's work has been achieved, including the impressive
218. See id. at 8-11 (comparing and praising the Special Court to its ad hoc predecessors).
219. "Slopping out" involves providing prisoners not with integral toilet facilities
overnight, but only buckets or bedpans which they then, personally, clean or "slop out"
into a communal facility the next morning. See Author's Interviews, Freetown (JuneAug. 2004). The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture ("CPT") considers "slopping out" to constitute degrading treatment violating international law. See
ANTONIO CASSESE, INHUMAN STATES: IMPRISONMENT, DETENTION AND TORTURE IN EuROPE TODAY 49-50 (1996); see also Report to the Irish Government on the visit to Ireland
carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 26 September to 5 October 1993,
CPT/Inf (95)14 (Strasbourg/Dublin Dec. 13, 1995); Report to the United Kingdom
Government on the visit to the United Kingdom carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment from 29 July 1990 to 10 August 1990, CPT/Inf.(91) 15, 1 229 (Nov. 26, 1991).
The practice was also declared a violation of human rights recently in Scotland. See
Robert Napier (AP) v. The Scottish Ministers, Case P739/01, 2004 S.L.T. SSS (Sess.,
Scot.) (Lord Bonomy, J.); see also The Greek Case, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONY.ON HUM. RTs.
468, 484 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
220. Controversy erupted at the Court in July 2004 over allegations that detainees'
family members had been improperly subjected to intrusive body searches by Detention
Facility staff. The allegations were not substantiated, but defence counsel also raised
objections about procedural unfairness in the inquiry conducted into the allegations.
The matter was given prominent coverage by the local press. See July 23, 2004 Transcript, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-T, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, at 21
(Trial Chamber I 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Transcripts/RUF-072304.pdf.
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time in which many defendants have been brought to trial, despite the complexity of war crimes investigations in a country in
which armed conflict has only recently ceased. 22 ' Those achievements stand as testament to the skill and professionalism of the
Court's management and, particularly, Prosecution investigators.
That sense of urgency has, unfortunately, been lost at the trial
stage.2 22 In some respects this slowdown is in the interests of the
defendants, since the costs of the rapid speed with which the
Court was previously moving are likely to fall squarely on the
defendants. 223 On the other hand, the slowdown has produced
serious questions, touched on above, about the financial future
of the Court. As I noted earlier in the paper, this may very well
raise concerns - sure to be litigated by the defendants at an
appropriate juncture - about the arbitrariness of detention by
an institution which cannot guarantee its own ability to complete
the very 'judicial" process it subjects defendants to.
The fairness of trials before the Court is further imperiled
by two crucial factors: judicial impropriety, and inequality of
arms. Both of these points are crucial to the future success or
failure of the Court, and more broadly to the enterprise of international criminal justice, so I turn to each of them now in some
detail.
a. Judicial Professionalism
The cornerstone of the system of international criminal justice isjudicial independence and professionalism. 224 Without independence, the system would lose legitimacy and fail. But
equally, without judges who will wield that independence wisely
and professionally, the system will fail.2 2 5 If judicial independence is the cornerstone, perceived judicial professionalism and
propriety is the cement. At the Special Court, hard questions
must be asked about the cracks emerging in that cement.
The problem is not the slow pace of trials in the Trial Chamber - that can be rectified. Even inappropriate questioning like
221. See supra pt. IIA.
222. See BRINGINGJUSTICE, supra note 6, at 13 (discussing the judges' long response
time for motions).
223. See id. at 21-26 (discussing limited financing for the defense).
224. See id. at 11.
225. See id.
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that mentioned above and detailed elsewhere 2 26 can be improved with a little judicial education. -Some respected commentators have called the current quality of judicial reasoning coming out of the Special Court into question; for example, in a
forthcoming piece in the Journal of International CriminalJustice,
Judge Antonio Cassese severely criticizes the Court's reasoning
in the Lomg Amnesty Decision.2 27 But the quality ofjudicial reasoning is always contestable. The judges have in fact dispensed in a
remarkably short time with a complex array of pre-trial motions,
228
helping to reduce overall trial lengths.
What is disturbing is the questionable judgment exercised
when judges' professionalism has been called into question by
the adversarial parties. I have provided a more detailed account
of some of these issues elsewhere, 229 but it is worth highlighting
two particular episodes.
First, we should note the Judge Robertson's questionable
decision to accept a position on the Court's bench after earlier
making statements which appeared to prejudge the guilt of the
RUF and Charles Taylor in his 2002 book, Crimes Against Humanity.230 Robertson accused the RUF of "committing such crimes"
as torture, pillage, rape, looting, amputation and mutilation, and
terrorization of the civilian population, and gave graphic descriptions of those crimes. 23 ' He described Foday Sankoh as
226. For details of the inappropriate questioning which occurred at the initial appearances, see PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 11. Human Rights Watch has
also drawn attention to references by trial judges to the "degree of intelligence of a
witness," literacy, and to one incident where the judges required a witness with amputated arms to raise them in Court to allow the fact of amputation to be recorded. See
BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 16-17. The same passage also points out that "judges
have demonstrated sensitivity in other instances to witnesses, particularly with rape victims .... " Id.
227. Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty, Prosecutor v.
Kallon & Kamara, Joined Cases SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL-2004-16-AR72(E), Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber 2003), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/
Documents/SCSL-04-15-PT-060-I.pdf [hereinafter Lome Amnesty Decision]; see also
Antonio Cassese, The Special Court andInternationalLaw: The Decision Concerningthe Lome
Amnesty Agreement, 2(4) J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. (2004); cf Daniel Macaluso, Absolute and Free
Pardon: The Effect of the Amnesty Provision in the Lome Peace Agreement on theJurisdiction of
the Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 347 (2001).
228. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 11-12.
229. See James Cockayne, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Decisions on the Recusal of
Judges Robertson and Winter, 2(4) J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1154 (2004).
230. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
JUSTICE (2002).
231. See Decision on Defence Motion Seeking the Disqualification of Justice Rob-
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"the [N]ation's butcher" 23 2 and a "psychopath given to mutilating civilians," Charles Taylor as the RUF's "sponsor,"233 and the
RUF as "guilty of atrocities on a scale that amounts to a crime
against humanity [which] must never again be forgiven. '234 This
conflict eventually led to his removal from all RUF cases, 23 5 and
perhaps even from the Presidency of the Court.2 3 6 (Arguably, it
may also provide the basis for his removal from the remaining
cases.)
Second, Judge Winter handled a motion for her recusal in
an even more controversial fashion.2 3 7 Shortly after the Robertson removal events, counsel for Sam Hinga Norman filed a motion seeking Judge Winter's recusal from hearing a motion concerning the inclusion in the indictment against him of charges
relating to enlisting child soldiers, because of alleged links between Winter and UNICEF (an amicus curiae in the proceeding)
on this specific issue. 238 Winter, who had taken over from Robertson as Acting President of the Court, responded to the motion in a manner apparently so problematic that the Court later
made her response, already released to the public, confidential.
The Court's public records indicate that Robertson responded
and that, mysteriously, the Prosecution and some members of
the Defense quickly signed some kind of agreement (again, confidential) relating to the matter. Equally mysteriously, the Winter-Robertson exchange was excluded from discussion in the juertson from the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-AR]5-15,
Special Ct. for Sierra Leone, at 3 (Appeals Chamber 2003), availableat http://www.sc-sl.
org/SCSL-04-15-PT-058.pdf.
232. Id. at 2.
233. Id. at 3.
234. Id.
235. See Decision on Defence Motion Seeking the Disqualification ofJustice Robertson from the Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-2004-AR15-15,
Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber 2003), availableat http://www.sc-sl.org/
SCSL-04-15-PT-058.pdf; see also Press Release, Plenary Meeting of the Special Court, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Justice Geoffrey Robertson Disqualified from the Appeals
Chamber in RUF Cases (Mar. 13, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-031304.htmi.
236. Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Press and Public Affairs Office,
Justice Renate Winter to Act as President of the Special Court (Mar. 16, 2004), available
at http://www.sc-sl.org/Press/pressrelease-031604.html.
237. Decision on the Motion to RecuseJudge Winter from the Deliberation in the
Preliminary Motion on the Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case
No. SCSL-2004-14-PT, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber 2004).
238. See id.
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dicial decision which followed (which determined not to remove
Judge Winter from the proceeding).239 Chief Norman sacked
two of his lawyers soon afterwards.
Dysfunction within the Appeals Chamber has also spilled
over into antagonistic passages in judicial decisions. For example, commenting on a separate opinion of Judge Robertson in
the Child Soldiers decision, Judge Gelaga King wrote:
Finally, I will end up by referring to a passage in Justice Robertson's decision. He states, inter alia:
the baggage train, as Shakespeare's Henry V reminds us,
is not always a place of safety for children, and the Little
Drummer Boy may be as much at risk as the 'powder
monkey' on the Les Miserables barricades.
With all due respect to my learned colleague, it is this type of
egregious journalese the relevance of which I cannot fathom
that has
made it impossible for me to appreciate his reason0
ing.

24

It is not uncommon for sibling judges to criticize each other's
reasoning; it is the combative tone - arguably excessive and
needless - of this particular attack which marks it out.
All of these episodes raise concerns about professional judgment in the Appeals Chamber, giving ammunition to those who
would cast doubt on the quality of their broader judgment, the
wisdom of those selecting such judges, and on the safety ofjudicial independence and propriety in the Court generally. 2 '" Unfortunate incidents elsewhere - such as the decision by Judge
Vaz, then Vice-President of the ICTR, to allow an attorney from
her home country of Senegal to stay in her house while appear239. Id. A later attempt by counsel for Sesay to force the public release of these
documents was rejected. See Decision on Confidential Motion Seeking Disclosure of
Documentation Relating to the Motion on the Recruitment of Child Soldiers, Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case No. SCSL-04-15-PT-219, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone (Appeals Chamber 2004).
240. Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack ofJurisdiction (Child Recruitment), Separate Opinion ofJustice Gelaga King, Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL04-14-AR72(E), Special Ct. of Sierra Leone, 1 7 (Appeals Chamber, 2004), available at
http://sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-14-AR72(E)-131-7398.pdf (citing Paragraph 8 of Justice Robertson's Dissenting Opinion).
241. See BRINGING JusricE, supra note 6, at 14-16 (discussing the Appeals Chamber); id. at 16 (specifically discussing the availability of the Appeals Chamber); id. at 45
(recommending that Chambers resolve motions timely, treat witnesses consistently and
with respect, and participate in ongoing sessions on criminal procedure, substantive
law, courtroom management, and treatment of witnesses).
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ing in a case on which Vaz was sitting 24 2 - allow critics to suggest that the failure ofjudicial propriety may be systemic. There
are few remedies one can suggest for this kind of failure, if it is
in fact systemic - except that States and the United Nations
should select international judges with extreme care. It does,
however, send a warning signal about the vulnerability of the system of law of war enforcement upon which the United Nations
and the international community is hanging so many expectations. The international community must take the institutional
concerns seriously, investing the resources and energy needed to
educate and prepare judges for the solemn responsibilities they
are being given. 243 Judicial selection procedures need to be refined, to improve the quality of judicial practice.2 4 4 Civil society
also has an important role to play here, for example in monitoring and recording judicial practice, and informing States of the
records of judicial candidates.
b. Inequalities of Arms
The defense of accused war criminals is a complex and challenging task, made more challenging within the Special Court by
the particular dynamics of the hybrid tribunal - especially its
location within the affected country.2 4 5 Unfortunately, that task
has been made even harder at the Special Court by serious
under-resourcing and structural design flaws. 24 6 Observers have
long been troubled by the inequality of arms before international criminal tribunals, with an institutionally supported Prosecution at times appearing to vastly outgun an isolated and disorganized Defense. 24 7 Human Rights Watch recently summarized
the emerging problem: "While fairness does not require a dollar
242. See Decision on Motion by Nglrumpatsefor Disqualification of Trial Judges,
Prosecutor v. Karamera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Special Ct. of Sierra Leone (Appeals
Chamber 2004), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Karemera/decisions/040517c.html; see also Press Release, ICTR, Presiding Judge Withdraws from
Karamera et al. case, ICTR/INFO-9-2-390.EN (May 18, 2004).
243. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 38-39 (discussing international cooperation); id. at 42-44 (stating recommendations to the United Nations and donors to the
Special Court).
244. See id. at 18 (suggesting that future judicial appointees have criminal trial experience).
245. See id. at 10 (discussing the establishment of the Special Court).
246. See id. at 21-29 (noting the inadequate resources given to the defence).
247. For a brief overview, see Sylvia de Bertodano, What Price Defence? Resourcing the
Defence at the ICTY, 2(2) J. INT'L C~iM. J. 503 (2004).
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for dollar match between resources available to the OTP and the
defense, the extent of disproportionate allocation of such resources at the Special Court could contribute to a perception
248
that trials are unfair and that equality of arms is not upheld.
In municipal systems, lone defendants face an inequality of arms
when confronted with the resources and authority of a State; in
the international system, the defendant confronts the resources,
authority and normative structures of the entire State system.
Partly to address the dangerous potential for inequality which
results, the Special Court took an important step away from the
ad hoc tribunal model, empowering a centralized Defense Office,
modeled on the U.S. system of Public Defenders, to provide representation to defendants in certain circumstances, and to coordinate the representation of clients in other circumstances, including through the provision of common research services.

24 9

This represented an important step forward in the design of international criminal tribunals. Nevertheless, focus on this institutional development aspect may have masked the reality of the
situation on the ground, even allowing external observers to
think that the problem of inequality of arms has been "solved."
It has not been solved. The Prosecution has been overseeing investigations for two years; most Defense teams are only began investigations after the commencement of trial. 25" The Prosecution investigates with court vehicles, satellite phones, dedicated drivers and security, translators, and professional
international investigators; Defense team staff are not formally
permitted to use Court transport (transport costs are supposed
to be covered by each team's budget), have no dedicated drivers
or security or access to logistical equipment, and must find their
own translators and investigation staff, with only national-level
salaries for those staff covered by their budgets. 251 Until recently, investigators (who are employed - and therefore approved - by the Defense Office) had to have a background in
248. BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 6.
249. SeeJohn R.W.D. Jones et al., The Special Courtfor Sierra Leone: A Defence Perspective, 2(1)J. INT'L CRIM. J. 211 (2004).
250. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 27.

251. Cf id. at 6. The Defence Office is allocated one vehicle, which it is expected
to make available to all Defence Teams. In reality, the vehicle is used primarily by the
Defence Office staff, rather than the contracted lawyers, and is expected to remain in
Freetown and not be taken beyond for investigative purposes.

2005]

THE FRAYING SHOESTRING

policing; many of the defendants are charged with attacks on
police as a Crime Against Humanity. That policy was recently
changed,2 5 2 but only after a significant delay resulting in some
defendants starting trial without investigators. The Prosecution,
in contrast, has relied heavily on skilled, practiced international
investigators, many with ICTY and ICTR experience.253 The
Prosecution budget takes up a large percentage of the overall
U.S.$83 million budget; the Defense teams receive around
U.S.$4 million altogether. Prosecution staff are permanently stationed in Freetown; many Defense counsel come and go (with
the associated travel costs significantly eroding Defense budgets) 254 The Prosecutor is an Assistant Secretary General; the
head of the Defense Office is many rungs lower in the U.N. employment hierarchy. The Prosecution has until recently received
approximately five times the office space assigned to the Defense, and also greater access to office resources.2 5 5 The Prosecutor has easy access to a helicopter to go up-country; Defense
personnel hitch a ride in public transport. The Prosecution can
conduct systematic investigations and analyses of evidence across
cases; the Defense is fragmented into nine different teams - an
important and necessary step to protect defendants' rights, but
25 6
one creating coordination challenges.
Nor is the Defence Office functioning as it was originally
envisaged. There have been three occupants of the top post in
the Defence Office in less than eighteen months, none at the
level of seniority originally planned. That the Court budgeted
252. Cf id. at 26.
253. Human Rights Watch also points out that investigation budgets are at present
intended to last only six months into trial, even though Prosecution disclosure is expected to continue well after that point in each trial. See id. at 27.
254. See id. at 103.
255. See id. at 6-7, 23-24. Until recently, the defence teams have received three
offices, each roughly 12' x 15', to share between nine teams. Each team comprises
three or four counsel and usually at least one assistant and one investigator. Each office
was therefore expected to accommodate roughly 15 people, during periods in which
the Court was in session, not only impacting on productivity, but also confidentiality. Cf
id. at 23. These 15 people shared three computers. Six offices, each roughly half the
size of the previous offices, have recently become available, roughly doubling the space
- to 40% of the space available onsite to the OTP. The OTP also has an off-site evidence storage facility, and a separate residence for the Prosecutor. Defence teams must
use a Registry-wide fax - which means sensitive documents cannot be faxed - and also
share a photocopier with the entire Registry. Needless to say, OTP has private access to
both of these resources.
256. See id. at 23.
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for more senior positions than the level at which it has ultimately
employed the acting and permanent Principal Defenders suggests either that the Court was trying to save money, or that it
could not induce candidates of the requisite experience for employment at the higher level to relocate to Freetown. All three
occupants of the position are generally considered to have done
a remarkable job with the available resources. Nor has the Office provided substantial research support to Defense teams as
had been envisaged. Given that was a central justification for the
strict control of defense budgets, the only result can be that Defense teams will either not carry out the necessary research, leading to sub-standard representation or will, as many are now doing, turn to lower-cost options, such as junior lawyers, unpaid
interns and pro bono arrangements with U.S. Law School clinics
257
and firms.
Even more disturbing to many of the detainees in terms of
inequality of arms, however, is the Prosecution's access to the
diplomatic community, press and Sierra Leonean population.
The Office of the Prosecutor has run an aggressive Outreach
campaign, originally out of its own office, and later through a
Registry Outreach office.2 58 Independent Defence staff have
only recently been brought into that Program. 25 91 While the
Prosecutor has been careful to emphasize that the defendants
are innocent until proven guilty, 260 access to Outreach has also
given him an opportunity to represent the Prosecution's posi257. At least two defence teams have made impromptu arrangements with U.S. law
schools to provide clinical support. The Defence Office recently organised for a prominent New York firm to provide pro bono research support. The problem of reliance on
overseas pro bono support is also exacerbated by the lump-sum payment system which
caps defence counsel's fees, reducing their incentive to work on the cases. See BRINGING
JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 7, 25-26.
258. See PROMISES AND PITFALLS, supra note 6, at 17-18 (providing a detailed sum-

mary); see also DRAFT LEGACy REPORT, supra note 197; First Annual Report, supra note
40, at 26-27.
259. In an e-mail to the author, Court officials point out that Robert Vincent attended even the early Outreach meetings organized out of the Office of the Prosecutor,
and since the Defense Office falls within his remit, he was mandated to represent defense interests at those meetings. See E-mail from Allison Cooper of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone to James Cockayne (Sept. 22, 2004) (on file with author). That formalistic approach fails to appreciate the impact that the separate representation of the
Prosecution, without independent Defence representation, may have had in the early
stages of public opinion formation in Sierra Leone.
260. See Alastair Leithead, S Leone Awaits Catalogue of Horror, BBC NEWS, June 3,
2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3774979.stm.
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tion to the population, without significant Defense representation. It cannot be doubted that the visibility of the Prosecution
amongst the local population far outstrips that of the Defense,
creating a danger of unwarranted identification of Court and
Prosecution interests. There has been a greater Defense presence in recent months, but the Prosecution continues to enjoy
first mover advantages in this area. Outreach is positive in that it
sensitizes the population to the work of the Court, but it is problematic because, first, many of the defendants feel that they are
being tried in the court of public opinion as much as in the Special Court - and Outreach creates a trial in absentia in those
terms - and, second, because this process actually feeds back
into the Special Court's processes by encouraging potential witnesses to come forward and allowing the Prosecution to work
actively during Outreach trips in order to identify potential witnesses. Absent Defense representatives, the encouragement
given to potential witnesses for the Defence to come forward is
less active.
The unverified implication is that Outreach may produce
more Prosecution than Defense witnesses. There is a danger
that the public begins to perceive the Prosecution and the Court
as broadly indistinguishable. The blanket use of protection measures for insider witnesses also exacerbates this tendency, since it
leads to challengeable and less sympathetic insider testimony occurring in closed hearings out of public earshot, while more sympathetic victim testimony occurs in public, skewing the public
perception of the judicial record. One of the indirect results of
these processes appears to be that the defendants feel obliged to
respond to these influences on public opinion in the only place
they can - the courtroom. They are given an incentive to politicize proceedings. The result is that they lose faith in the trial
process, and refuse to cooperate, as both Chief Sam Hinga Norman and Augustine Gbao have now chosen to do. 2 61 That result
only serves to undermine the legitimacy of the trials in the eyes
of the affected population and weaken the contribution that
criminal prosecution can make to stabilization and peace-building.
What this all tends to suggest is that the defense must be
261. See, e.g., Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Norman Communications Restricted (Jan. 21, 2004).
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given a more prominent role in the life and budget of criminal
tribunals, if their legitimacy is to be safeguarded. This may
mean giving a Defense Office greater independence, to make it
really the Fourth Pillar (alongside Prosecution, Registry and
Chambers) that it is often claimed to be.2 62 In the Special Court,
the Office could be removed from the Registry structure. It may
be too difficult to amend the Statute, so some other arrangement might be reached where the Registry granted the Office
greater autonomy. The Principal Defender should, at least in
future tribunals, be employed at the same level as the Prosecutor, and be engaged in Tribunal development from the same
time as the Prosecutor, to ensure defense interests are adequately represented. Only through such structural reforms will
we ensure that defendants' rights are protected, and with them
the perceived legitimacy of tribunals as an effective tool for enforcing the law of war. Without that legitimacy, the United Nations and the international community risk aligning their interests with failing institutions, undermining their own authority
and capacity to achieve peace and justice.
F. Rethinking Hybrid Tribunals: Implications and Recommendations
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has achieved a very
great deal in a very short time, but its first six months of trials
also point to difficulties and lessons about the complexities of
operating a hybrid tribunal. In this section, I highlight some of
the implications of Sections 3-5 and make recommendations for
steps that might be taken in the short, medium and long terms
to improve the outlook for the Special Court, hybrid tribunals
generally, and for the achievement of the complementary objectives of peace and justice.
1. Hybrid Tribunals - Not Just Shoestring Justice
Many of the problems the Special Court confronts - principally under-resourcing, politicization and complex operational
challenges - flow from unrealistic expectations about what the
Court can and cannot achieve with the resources it has been
given. Too often, the Special Court is perceived as a scaleddown version of the ad hoc tribunals - shoestring justice. It is
not. Its location "in theater" and the resulting intersection with
262. See, e.g., First Annual Report, supra note 40, at 16-17.
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local political and social dynamics present a range of operational
challenges that the ad hoc tribunals have not faced. To overcome
those challenges, it may be necessary to give a hybrid tribunal
more, and different, resources than we give an ad hoc tribunal,
ranging from diplomatic expertise to communications staff. A
hybrid tribunal's presence in the affected country fundamentally
alters the dynamics of its work. It has upsides - helping to stimulate debate and organic reconciliation within the country. And
it has downsides - increasing security costs and operational
challenges, rendering complex the question of legacy, and risking the politicization of the judicial process. We need to think
very carefully about these dynamics: in what we - especially the
Management Committee - expect of the Special Court in the
next couple of years; in what we expect of hybrid tribunals generally; and in how we expect the International Criminal Court
and the United Nations to engage with each other, and how they
should carry out their complementary peace and justice mandates.
2. Saving the Fraying Shoestring in Sierra Leone
The Special Court itself faces some immediate dangers; understanding how we can avoid those dangers will teach us about
the changes we need to make in future to hybrid tribunal design,
to our own expectations, to resourcing, and to the United Nations' role in enforcing the law of war.
Without immediate steps to ensure the Special Court has
adequate finance - for example by agreeing to fund the rest of
the Court's work from the United Nations' general appropriations budget, rather than by voluntary contributions - we risk a
financial crisis for the Court down the line, inducing senior staff
to jump ship before it sinks, to protect their finances and reputations. Eventually, if the money simply runs out, contractors will
cease performance, and the whole enterprise might grind to a
halt. At some point in that process, the defendants will move en
masse (inside the Courtroom, or through the national press and
political channels) for release from arbitrary detention. Such a
scenario would only taint the Court, the United Nations and the
whole project of international criminal justice.
What should we do? The experiment in voluntary contributions has been tried - and has failed. Allowing a bail-out by the
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United States or even a small group of countries may fatally taint
the legitimacy of the Court. Providing finance through assessed
U.N. contributions, for the remainder of its life, is the only way
to ensure the Special Court has the necessary financial guarantees. The international community must come up with the
money, or it will have failed the Special Court - and the population of Sierra Leone.
Next, immediate steps must be taken, preferably by the parties and by the President of the Court, to radically accelerate trial
proceedings. Court sittings should be modeled on those of the
ICTR under President Mose. Lunch-breaks must be reduced to
one hour. Adjournments must be minimized. Additionally, the
Trial Chamber should force the Prosecution to rationalize its witness lists. Many complex, government-level prosecutions at the
ICTR and ICTY are run with fifty witnesses.2 6 3 Why does the
Prosecution at the Special Court need three or four times that
number?
Third, there must be a radical and immediate improvement
in the quality of Defense resourcing (and consequently representation). The Defense are terribly under-resourced, but there
may simply be no more resources to give them - unless money
is taken out of the Prosecution budget. Perhaps that is the radical remedy needed. Alternatively, the Management Committee
should consider such steps as the organization of an international consortium of pro bono lawyers to provide research support
to the Office. For the future, consideration could be given to
subjecting defense counsel to performance monitoring by a
panel of independent experts.
Finally, further thought needs to be given to aspects of international cooperation with international criminal tribunals.
The mechanisms available to these courts to exercise diplomatic
leverage need to be creatively reconsidered, and care should be
taken to ensure personnel with diplomatic experience are employed in senior positions at new courts. In the Special Court
context, the Management Committee must take political action
to secure the Special Court's custody of Charles Taylor. Following the Court's failure to secure custody over Taylor when he was
263. Justice Hassan B. Jallow, The OTP-ICTR: Ongoing Challenges of Completion, Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor 5 (Nov. 1, 2004), availableat
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/Jallow-presentation.
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in Ghana, the President wrote to the Secretary-General on June
10, 2003, requesting Chapter VII powers for the Court.26 4 That
request seems to have gone nowhere, perhaps because the Management Committee is unwilling to put Nigeria (where Taylor
has sought asylum), one of its members and a significant regional player, on the spot. 26 5 The cost of that laxity is increasingly paid in the currency of the legitimacy of the Court. The
United Kingdom, United States and others must bring pressure
on President Obasanjo to hand Taylor over. They may have to
offer him strong incentives, to overcome Obasanjo's unwillingness to create tension between himself and the Nigerian military
by allowing Taylor to reveal in Court what many suspect is dirty
laundry regarding diamond-trafficking within the Nigerian military. In addition, the Management Committee will have to accept that securing Court custody of Taylor will both significantly
extend the life of the Court, and increase its day to day costs
(due to heightened security concerns and greater international
attention). They must be prepared to underwrite those financial
and political costs, for the benefit of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process. Without Taylor, the Court will tell the truth - but not the whole truth.
3. Rethinking the Central Pillars
The challenges faced by a hybrid tribunal like the Special
Court also help illuminate some of the weaknesses of the central
pillars in the existing approach to law of war enforcement, particularly the role of the Bench and the Defense.
Judicial professionalism is the cornerstone of the trial process, on which the whole project of international criminal justice
is built. But as we have seen, at times it is not living up to the
high standards of professionalism set by other actors within the
process. Judicial practice could be significantly improved by judicial education. The Special Court bench has already received
some instruction in The Hague.2 6 6 Human Rights Watch's suggestion that all judges in the Second Trial Chamber have criminal trial experience also appears eminently sensible, and points
264. See FIRsT EIGHTEEN MONTHS, supra note 47, at 11.
265. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1478 did, however, explicitly request that
states cooperate with the Special Court. See S.C. Res. 1478, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess.,
4751st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1478 (2003).
266. See BRINGING JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 17-18.
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to the need, in future tribunals, for higher minimum qualifications for judicial candidates.2 6 7
Judicial decision-making will determine the quality of the
record provided by criminal trial, not only through its own judgments but also by the control it exerts over Prosecution and Defense narratives within the trial process. Both parties will only
improve the nuance in their theories of the case, examination
and cross-examination, and general advocacy if they are placed
under pressure from the bench to do so. (The parties might
also bring pressure on each other, for example through tough
cross-examination of each other's witnesses, but if the bench
does not exhibit a preference for the more nuanced approach
when it is offered, the other side will not have the incentive to
change their position.) In the Special Court, this may require
the bench: to press for greater historical clarity and accuracy; to
pursue the details of, especially, the involvement of ECOMOG
and President Kabbah in particular situations; not to accept allegations of command-and-control at face value; and not to be satisfied with one explanation of events but actively to seek out
others.
Judges could also reduce the incentives to defendants to use
their trials as political platforms by imposing a sub judice rule on
all parties to the trial. That would leave the Sierra Leone and
international community free to comment on the trial but restrict the opportunity for the parties to intertwine political and
legal narrative. Since the defendants face significant restrictions
(nominally for security reasons) on their freedom of expression
and thus their rights of political participation, 2 68 it seems only
fair that the Prosecution should be similarly restricted. All Outreach should be done by Registry staff alone.
We may also need to rethink the current approach to the
Defense, particularly in relation to equality of arms issues. As I
have suggested above, the Defense needs to be given a greater
267. See id. at 18.
268. See, e.g., Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Norman Communications Restricted (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://www.sc-sl.org; see also TRC Appeal,
Case No. SCSL-2003-08-PT, Special Ct. for Sierra Leone,
39-40 (Appeals Chamber
2003); cf Press Release, ICTY Registry, Registry Imposes Communication Restrictions
on Detainees with Regard to Political Campaigning in the Media from the Tribunal's
Detention Unit, ICTY Doc. No.JL/P.I.S./810e (Dec. 12, 2003), availableat http://www.
un.org/icty/latest/index.htm.
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prominence within the life and budget of the Court, from an
earlier point in the process. While the ICC, designed before the
Special Court, lacks even the rudimentary centralized coordination mechanism provided by the Special Court Defense Office
model,2 6 9 the ICC Prosecutor has a duty to investigate exculpatory evidence that ad hoc tribunal Prosecutors have not had, 7 °
presumably including by requesting exculpatory material from
the United Nations. How that will impact on U.N. peace-making
processes remains to be seen.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone stands at a critical moment in not only its own development, but in the maturing of
the system of international criminal justice, and the whole idea
that the law of war can be effectively enforced through individualized prosecutions. The honeymoon is over; the U.N. community is at a critical moment of reassessment. We have asked a
very great deal of the Special Court, as we do of hybrid tribunals
generally. Their operation in-theater exposes them to the very
political and social dynamics over which we ask them to sit in
detached judgment. That creates new hurdles for hybrids which
the ad hoc tribunals have not faced - yet we have asked them to
do more with less. The Special Court's experiences to date
teach us much about the challenges that the ICC will face in the
future, and about the complexities for the United Nations of balancing a role in making peace with a role in bringing justice.
Most important, however, the Special Court's experiences to
date have helped to highlight the vulnerabilities of the existing
approach. The shoestring seems to be fraying. There is still
time to repair it. If we do not, and it snaps, we risk undermining
the confidence of the international community generally in the
effectiveness of prosecution as a tool for enforcing the law of
269. The ICC system does, however, have a strong International Criminal Bar Association which acts as advocate of defense rights, but is an external actor, excluded from
the internal workings of the Court. See Official Website of the Int'l Crim. Bar Ass'n, at
http://www.bpi-icb.org/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
270. See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, 53rd Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/CONF/183.9, as amended by process-verbaux of Nov. 10, 1998,July 12, 1999, May
8, 2000, Jan. 17, 2001,Jan. 16, 2002, art. 54 (1998). Article 54 states:
Duties and powers of the Prosecutorwith respect to investigations
1. The Prosecutor shall:
(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all
facts and evidence relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally;
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war. Unless we lower our expectations of hybrid tribunals or increase the resources, time and support we are prepared to give
them, we must prepare for disappointment.

